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It is tragic that our law schools do not have an orientation
course in logic. We had that great line from Professor
Kingsfield in The Paper Chase: 'You come in here with a
head full of mush and you leave thinking like a lawyer.' The
Socratic method is the most valuable tool to train students to
think like a lawyer. Yet the students-and unfortunately too
many of their professors-apparently do not know the
elements of deductive and inductive reasoning.
Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert'
I. INTRODUCTION 2
In 2007, the University of Pittsburgh Law Review published the
essay Logic for Law Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer,' co-
authored by federal appellate judge Ruggero J. Aldisert 4 and two of
t Harry and Helen Hutchens Research Professor, South Texas College of Law
(prior to Fall 2011); Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law, Campbell University
(beginning Fall 2011). Several friends were generous with their time and offered
helpful comments on an early draft, including John Blevins, Steve Clowney, John
Dolan, Sharon Finegan, Adam Gershowitz, Ken Kettering, Bob Lloyd, Dru
Stevenson and Steve Ware. South Texas College of Law graciously provided
financial support.
1. Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Senior Circuit Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert
of the US. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, How APPEALING (July 7, 2003,
12:00 a.m.), http://howappealing.1aw.com/20q/2003_07_01 20q-
appellateblogarchive.html.
2. Much of the text and many of the accompanying footnotes in Parts I and II of
this article also appear in the companion article referenced infra note 16 and
accompanying text.
3. Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Logic for Law Students: How to Think Like a
Lawyer, 69 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (2007).
4. Judge Aldisert was nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson to a seat on
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on July 12, 1968, and confirmed by
the Senate twelve days later. See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Aldisert,
Ruggero John, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
[Vol. 56: 15811582
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his law clerks.5 The essay begins with the statement: "Logic is the
lifeblood of American law."6 It then asks the question prompted by
Professor Kingsfield's famous line above 7-"What is thinking like a
www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=21&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Feb. 6, 2011). Cf Nathan Koppel, WSJ to the Senate: Confirm Judges Now!, WALL
ST. J. (Sep. 8, 2008), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/09/08/wsj-to-the-senate-
confirm-judges-now/ (stating that President George W. Bush's federal judicial
nominees "waited 348 days, on average, from nomination to confirmation, as
compared to 238 days for Clinton's nominees"). He assumed senior status on
December 31, 1986.
5. Co-authors Stephen Clowney and Jeremy D. Peterson were law clerks to
Judge Aldisert during the 2006-07 term. Aldisert, supra note 3. The former is on the
faculty at the University of Kentucky College of Law. See Profile: Stephen
Clowney, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY: COLLEGE OF LAW,
www.law.uky.edu/index.php?hid=2 1.
6. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 1. Not everyone on the federal bench agrees. See
Richard Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REv. 827, 833-34
(1988) (suggesting that "the life of the law really cannot be logic"). Cf OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience.").
7. The quotation is from Professor Kingsfield's remarks, early in the semester,
to his first-year contracts class at Harvard Law School:
The study of law is something new and unfamiliar to most of you, unlike
any schooling you have ever been through before. We use the Socratic
method here: I call on you, ask you a question, and you answer it. Why
don't I just give you a lecture? Because through my questions, you learn to
teach yourselves. Through this method of questioning, answering,
questioning, answering, we seek to develop in you the ability to analyze
that vast complex of facts that constitute the relationships of members
within a given society. Questioning and answering. At times, you may feel
that you have found the correct answer. I assure you that this is a total
delusion on your part. You will never find the correct, absolute, and final
answer. In my classroom, there is always another question, another
question to follow your answer. Yes, you're on a treadmill. My little
questions spin the tumblers of your mind. You're on an operating table;
my little questions are the fingers probing your brain. We do brain surgery
here. You teach yourselves the law, but I train your mind. You come in
here with a skull full of mush, and you leave thinking like a lawyer.
THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox 1973).
For his portrayal of the "stuffy, crusty, brilliant, and despotic" law professor,
the seventy-one-year-old John Houseman received the Oscar for Best Supporting
Actor. See 1973 Awards Winners and History, FILMSITE,
http://www.filmsite.org/aa73.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). Houseman was cast as
Professor Kingsfield only after Melvyn Douglas, John Gielgud, James Mason,
Edward G. Robinson and Paul Scofield declined the opportunity. See Trivia for The
Paper Chase, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0070509/trivia (last visited Feb.
2,2011).
The movie is based on the book of the same title, published in 1970, and
authored by John Jay Osborn Jr., who, coincidentally, clerked on the U.S. Court of
2010] 1583
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lawyer?"-and offers this reply: "It means employing logic to
construct arguments."A The authors lament that "our law schools do
not give students an orientation in the principles of logic[,]"9 a
failure which "does violence to the essence of the law."10 They then
state the purpose of the essay:
[W]e endeavor to explain, in broad strokes, the core
principles of logic and how they apply in the law school
classroom. Our modest claim is that a person familiar with
the basics of logical thinking is more likely to argue
effectively than one who is not. We believe that students
who master the logical tenets laid out in the following pages
will be better lawyers and feel more comfortable when they
find themselves caught in the spotlight of a law professor on
a Socratic binge."
For twenty pages or so, the authors then elaborate on these "core
principles of logic" with primary emphasis on deductive reasoning
through syllogisms,12 and inductive reasoning by analogy.13
I teach Secured Transactions once or twice each academic year.
The course introduces students to many of the rules governing
transactions in which personal property (e.g., consumer goods,
inventory, equipment and other non-realty) secures payment of a
financial obligation. Our primary focus is on Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code14 and, time permitting, selected
provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 15
Appeals for the Third Circuit during the 1971-72 term, during Judge Aldisert's
tenure. The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 1089 (2009-10).
8. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 1.
9. Id. at 2.
10. Id
11. Id (footnote omitted).
12. See id. at 3-12.
13. Id. at 16-20.
14. One author has described Article 9 as "the crowning achievement of the
UCC project, and perhaps the entire uniform law enterprise." Edward J. Janger,
Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the
Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REv. 569, 571 (1998). See also Lawrence Ponoroff
& F. Stephen Knippenberg, Having One's Property and Eating it Too: When the
Article 9 Security Interest Becomes a Nuisance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 373, 374
(2006) ("Powerful, creative, comprehensive yet elegant, Article 9 is generally
regarded as the most innovative of the Code's articles.") (footnote omitted). My
pupils use less flattering terms, often asking if Article 9 was penned in a foreign
language and then translated. I do not have the heart to tell them that Grant Gilmore,
the primary architect of Article 9, taught French at Yale University for a few years
1584 [Vol. 56: 1581
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This article, together with a recently-published companion article
(Socrates, Syllogisms, and Sadistic Transactions: Challenges to
Mastering U C. C. Article 9 Through Deductive Reasoning6),
respond to the plea for a renewed emphasis on logic and deductive
reasoning in the classroom, from my perspective as a Secured
Transactions professor. Both articles (including Part I herein) start
with an introduction to the classic form of deductive reasoning: the
syllogism. But the two articles then take divergent paths. The
companion article offers and examines seven reasons why Article 9
itself may hinder the effective use of syllogisms in a Secured
Transactions course.17 Notwithstanding these statutory roadblocks,
this Article contends that Secured Transactions is an ideal course in
which the subject matter can be introduced, analyzed, and mastered
through deductive reasoning. Part III of this article illustrates-
through ten examples covering each of the five major topics of the
Secured Transactions course (attachment, perfection, priority,
default, and bankruptcy)-how narrative analysis can be expressed
as deductive syllogisms, and deductive syllogisms can be the
foundation for enhanced narrative analysis. Part IV examines
enthymemes (deductive reasoning which requires the audience to
infer part of the argument), and Part V reviews the formal fallacies
which undermine the logic of the syllogistic argument. Part VI offers
a brief conclusion (in syllogistic form, no less).
before enrolling in its law school at the age of twenty-nine. See Robert M. Jarvis,
Gilmore and Black at 50, 38 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 135, 139-40 (2007).
15. See II U.S.C. §§ 101 etseq. (2006).
16. 13 CHAPMAN L. REv. 97 (2010).
17. Those seven reasons are summarized in the companion article as follows:
First, Article 9 occasionally redefines ordinary terms in an unconventional
and counter-intuitive manner, which may lead students to reach logical,
but incorrect, conclusions when crafting a syllogistic argument. Second,
Article 9 sometimes fails to warn the reader that compliance with a
straightforward statutory provision may dictate a conclusion that is logical,
yet yields disastrous consequences. Third, Article 9 can lead to incorrect
conclusions because selected rules cannot be read literally. Fourth, Article
9 occasionally adopts rules that are inconsistent with policy-based
analysis, which may lead students to craft incorrect major premises and,
accordingly, to reach erroneous conclusions. Fifth, sometimes a rule of
Article 9 triggers a result so unexpected and inconsistent with the norm
that a logical approach to its understanding is undermined. Sixth, Article 9
occasionally adopts a rule that is so illogical as to render futile any attempt
to understand it logically. And seventh, many of the statutory rules of
Article 9 are riddled with exceptions, frustrating the ability to easily craft
the major premise of the syllogism.
Id. at 99-100.
2010] 1585
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II. DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND THE SYLLOGISM
Judge Aldisert and his co-authors offer an introduction to
deductive reasoning by noting its prevalence, and thus its
importance.' 8 They suggest that "90 percent of legal issues can be
resolved by deduction"' 9 and state that "deductive reasoning . . . is
the driving force behind most judicial opinions."20 In what specific
form does this deductive reasoning most often appear? The
syllogism-"a label logicians attach to any argument in which a
conclusion is inferred from two premises."2 '
The essay then introduces its audience to syllogisms by offering
"the immortal example of logicians everywhere" 22
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.23
The first sentence ("All men are mortal.") is known as "the
major premise," which "states a broad and generally applicable
truth[.]" 24 The second sentence ("Socrates is a man.") is labeled "the
minor premise" and "states a specific and usually more narrowly
18. See Aldisert, supra note 3, at 1.
19. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 2.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id. See also LEWIS H. LARUE, GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 172 (2d ed. 2001) ("In the kingdom of law, the syllogism reigns
supreme."); IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION To LOGIC 191 (8th ed.
1990) ("1 consider the invention of the form of syllogisms one of the most beautiful,
and also one of the most important, made by the human mind." (quoting German
philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz)); John Dewey, Logical Method
and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 21 (1924) (stating that the form of logic "which has
had greatest historic currency and exercised greatest influence on legal decisions, is
that of the syllogism"). But see Robert F. Hanley, Brush Up Your Aristotle, 3 J.
Ass'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 145, 147 (2006) ("Syllogisms are for professors.
They have a tone of condescension.").
22. Vincent Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward
an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 45, 91 n.206 (1985).
23. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 3. This example (sometimes in a slightly different
format) has appeared now and then in reported judicial opinions. See, e.g., Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 672-73 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,
474 F.3d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting); Russell v. Fort
McDowell Yavapai Nation (In re Russell), 293 B.R. 34, 40 (D. Ariz. 2003).
24. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 4. Cf PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION To LOGIC 260 (6th ed. 1997) (defining the "major term" as "the
predicate of the conclusion" and the "minor term" as "the subject of the
conclusion").
[Vol. 56: 15811586
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applicable fact[.]" 2 5 The third sentence ("Therefore, Socrates is
mortal.") is "the conclusion," which "draws upon these premises and
offers a new insight that is known to be true based on the
premises[.]" 2 6 The authors then share this important revelation:
[T]he three parts of a syllogism-the two premises and the
conclusion-are themselves built from three units. Logicians
call these units 'terms.' Two terms appear in each statement:
the 'major term' in the major premise and conclusion, the
'minor term' in the minor premise and conclusion, and the
'middle term' in the major and minor premises but not in the
conclusion. Notice that the middle term covers a broad range
of facts, and that if the conclusion is to be valid, the minor
term must be a fact that is included within the middle term.
Although the jargon can get confusing, the basic idea isn't
hard to grasp: Each statement in a syllogism must relate to
the other two.27
The syllogism appears to be a perfect fit as an instruction tool in
a rules-based course, such as Secured Transactions. The dominant
body of current law in Secured Transactions is statutory: U.C.C.
Article 9. Article 9 explains how to create an enforceable security
interest. 28 It provides rules governing perfection of a security
interest. 29 The statute devotes twenty-three provisions to priority
issues, 30 twenty-seven to filing matters, 3 ' and twenty-eight to default
concerns. 3 2 In total, Article 9 defines eighty (EIGHTY!) terms! 3 3
Given Article 9's exhaustive coverage and attention to detail, using
syllogisms to teach Secured Transactions seems like an ideal
approach. State the applicable rule (major premise). State the
25. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 6.
28. See generally U.C.C. § 9-203(a), (b). Statutory citations are to U.C.C. Article
9 as revised in 1999 and subsequently amended in 2001 and 2003 to reflect revisions
to U.C.C. Article 1 and U.C.C. Article 7, respectively.
29. See generally id. § §9-301-9-316.
30. See id. §§ 9-317-39.
31. See id. § §9-501-27.
32. See id. §§ 9-601-28.
33. See id. § 9-102(a)(1)-(80). Article 9 also incorporates many definitions found
elsewhere in the U.C.C. See id. § 9-102(b), (c).
2010] 1587
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relevant facts (minor premise). Draw a logical conclusion.34 How
hard can this be?35
From my side of the podium, the approach appears quite
workable. But, Article 9 has been my classroom companion for more
than fifteen years, so maybe my perspective is not shared by the
student who travels by my side for only fifteen weeks. Both of us can
conclude that Socrates must be mortal if we know that Socrates is a
man and all men are mortal. But using that simple illustration as a
template to master a set of statutory provisions as complex and
technical as Article 9 may appear impossible to the average student.
The task is not impossible, but it may be difficult. Some of the
difficulty may arise from the language of Article 9 itself, the major
topic of my earlier companion article.3 6 But unfamiliarity with
syllogistic analysis may pose additional difficulty. Hopefully that
difficulty is eased somewhat by the numerous examples offered in
Part III.
III. SYLLOGISMS IN SECURED TRANSACTIONS: TEN EXAMPLES
The legal issues examined in a Secured Transactions course lend
themselves, in significant part, to syllogistic analysis because the
myriad legal rules are statutory in nature. Most law professors expect
students to respond to essay questions in narrative, rather than
syllogistic, form. Nevertheless, the quality of narrative answers may
improve if students used the syllogism as a template to craft (at least
34. See James M. Boland, Legal Writing Programs and Professionalism: Legal
Writing Professors Can Join the Academic Club, 18 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 711, 722
(2006) (suggesting that, when crafting a syllogism, "the most important concept to
grasp is that the major premise states the rule of law, the minor premise states the
facts relevant to the major premise, and the conclusion flows logically from the
premises").
35. Many have observed that the syllogism bears a striking resemblance to the
traditional "IRAC" formula on which all law students cut their teeth. See, e.g., Adam
Todd, Neither Dead Nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the Teaching of Legal
Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REv. 893, 938 (2006) (observing that "the deductive
syllogism [is] commonly known by the acronym IRAC"); Kristin K. Robbins,
Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Reasoning, 27
VT. L. REv. 483, 485 (2002) (suggesting that the typical law student has "no idea"
that IRAC "is a watered-down version of the syllogism"); Anita Schnee, Logical
Reasoning "Obviously," 3 LEGAL WRITING: . LEGAL WRITING INST. 105, 106
(1997) ("For example, 'IRAC' is just another way of saying 'the deductive
syllogistic process."'). Cf Boland, supra note 34, at 723 ("When struggling to learn
legal analysis, students often lose the forest for the trees. The forest is the legal
argument (the syllogism), and the trees are the building blocks (IRAC).").
36. See supra notes 16 and 17 and accompanying text.
1588 [Vol. 56: 1581
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mentally, if not in writing) their responses. As one professor has
noted:
Doctrinal professors frequently complain that the weakest
part of answers to their exam questions is the analysis, the
application of the rule to the facts. Many students' answers
just leap from the rule to the conclusion with no significant
argument. Essentially what is missing is the minor premise
and showing its relationship to the major premise. First-year
students are simply not thinking syllogistically, and thus
logical reasoning based on finding not just the rule, but also
on applying the law to the facts, is frequently lacking.37
The standard Secured Transactions course covers five broad
topics: creating the security interest, perfecting the security interest,
the priority of the security interest, default and foreclosure, and
bankruptcy concerns. This Part III offers ten hypotheticals, a pair for
each topic. In the first of each pair, a narrative response is suggested,
followed by how that narrative response might be rewritten as one or
more syllogisms. In the second of each pair, the response is initially
sketched in syllogistic form, from which a narrative response is then
crafted. Hopefully this dual approach better illustrates how
syllogisms can be used as an effective teaching tool in the Secured
Transactions course.
A. Attachment
The Secured Transactions course often begins with a discussion
of the steps necessary to create an enforceable security interest in
Article 9.
The following two hypotheticals address attachment issues (and
are prefaced with a discussion of applicable law).
1. Hypothetical No. 1
Background: A security interest attaches, or becomes
enforceable, when value is given,3 9 the debtor has rights in the
37. See Boland, supra note 34, at 726.
38. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (indicating when a security interest is "enforceable");
id. § 9-203(a) (stating that a "security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes
enforceable").
39. Id. § 9-203(b)(1).
15892010]
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collateral4o and (in the majority of cases) the debtor has authenticated
a security agreement which describes the collateral 41 in a manner that
"reasonably identifies" it. 4 2 The security agreement also should
include (i) an "after-acquired property" clause if collateral will
include assets acquired by the debtor after the security agreement is
authenticated, 43 and (ii) a "future advance" clause if the collateral
will secure repayment of credit extended after the security agreement
is authenticated."
Hypothetical: ABC Company, a Delaware corporation, operates
three toy stores in Denver, where it maintains its chief executive
office. ABC needs a loan to purchase a new product line of stuffed
animal toys: Webkinz.45 On March 1, FinCo agrees to make a
40. Id. § 9-203(b)(2). Alternatively, the debtor must have "the power to transfer
rights in the collateral," a possibility discussed in § 9-203, cmt. 6.
41. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). See also §§ 9-102(a)(7) (defining "authenticate"); 9-
102(a)(73) (defining "security agreement").
Three other "security agreement" options exist, but none of them have
universal application to all forms of collateral. See id § 9-203(b)(3)(B)-(D). One
option permits an oral security agreement if the secured party (or its custodial agent)
takes possession of the collateral, which may be impractical (e.g., a debtor's vehicle
or computer) or impossible (e.g., a debtor's accounts or intellectual property). Id. §
9-203(b)(3)(B). Another option exists only if the secured party takes delivery of a
certificated security in registered form. Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(C). The last option applies
only if the secured party takes "control" of specific types of collateral: deposit
accounts, electronic chattel paper, electronic documents, investment property, and
letter-of-credit rights. See id. § 9-203(b)(3)(D).
42. See id. § 9-108(a) (indicating that a property description "is sufficient ... if
it reasonably identifies what is described").
43. See id. § 9-203(b)(l)-(2). The clause is enforceable against all of the debtor's
personalty other than commercial tort claims and some consumer goods.
44. See id. § 9-204(c).
45. For readers who live in a cave, do not have young children or for some other
reason are unfamiliar with this wildly popular product, "Webkinz pets are lovable
plush pets that each come with a unique Secret Code. With it, you enter Webkinz
World where you care for your virtual pet, answer trivia, earn KinzCash, and play
the best kids games on the net!" WEBKINZ, http://www.webkinz.com/us en/ (last
visited Feb. 5, 2011). One news article describes Webkinz World as "a cross
between an online gaming site, an educational site and the virtual world of Second
Life, but with animals instead of people. Youngsters may also use the site for text
chats with friends with whom they have shared their online identity." Bob Tedeschi,
Fuzzy Critters With High Prices Offer Lesson in New Concepts, N.Y. TIMES (March
26, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/technology/26ecom.htmln'Top/News/Busines
s/Small%20Business/E-Commerce. Launched in 2005, "Webkinz have quietly
grown into a phenomenon similar to Cabbage Patch Kids and Beanie Babies in years
past-the type of toy that a parent will drive across the state to snag, or pay four
times the selling price for on a Web site such as eBay." Allison Linn, Webkinz
1590 [Vol. 56: 1581
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$500,000 secured loan and ABC signs a written security agreement
that includes the following language: "To secure repayment of all
current and future obligations owed by Debtor to Secured Party,
Debtor grants to Secured Party a security interest in all of its current
and after-acquired inventory." ABC borrows the funds on March 6
and purchases a large shipment of the Webkinz toys on March 10.
Does FinCo have an enforceable security interest in the Webkinz
toys?
In narrative form, the model answer might look like this:
Under section 9-203, FinCo has an enforceable security
interest in the Webkinz toys if (i) value has been given, (ii)
ABC has rights in the toys, and (iii) ABC has authenticated a
security agreement which describes the Webkinz toys. 46
ABC is the "debtor" under section 9-102(a)(28) because it
has a property interest in the collateral.
As defined in section 1-204, "value" includes (among
other things) the binding commitment to extend credit, the
extension of immediately available credit and any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract. FinCo
gave value either when it promised to make the $500,000
loan, made the loan immediately available for withdrawal or
funded the loan.
ABC acquired rights in the toys when it purchased them
on March 10.
ABC's execution of the written security agreement on
March 1 constitutes "authentication," which is defined in
section 9-102(a)(7) to include the act of signing. ABC owns
and operates toy stores, so the Webkinz toys are part of its
"inventory," defined in section 9-102(a)(48) to include
goods held for sale. "Inventory" is a type of collateral, and
section 9-108(b)(3) permits collateral to be described by
type. ABC purchased the Webkinz toys after executing the
security agreement, but the agreement expressly includes
"after-acquired" inventory. So the description of collateral
includes the Webkinz toys.
All three conditions are present, so FinCo has an
enforceable security interest in the Webkinz toys when the
last of the three conditions is met: March 10.
sparks a craze, and a shortage, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 27, 2007),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18274547/.
46. U.C.C. § 9-203.
2010] 1591
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The foregoing narrative could be rewritten in the form of several
syllogisms, such as the following:
The person who has a property interest in the collateral
is a "debtor." (major premise)
ABC has a property interest in the collateral (the
Webkinz toys). (minor premise)
ABC is the debtor. (conclusion)
The debtor must authenticate any written security
agreement. (major premise)
ABC is the debtor. (minor premise)
ABC must authenticate any written security agreement.
(conclusion)
A signature is a form of authentication. (major premise)
ABC signed the written security agreement. (minor
premise)
ABC has authenticated the written security agreement.
(conclusion)
"Value" includes the binding commitment to extend
credit, the extension of immediately available credit and the
giving of any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. (major premise)
FinCo made a binding commitment on March 1 to
extend credit of $500,000, the funds of which were borrowed
by ABC on March 6 and serve as consideration sufficient to
support a simple contract. (minor premise)
FinCo has given value. (conclusion)
A debtor has rights in collateral if the debtor has
purchased the collateral. (major premise)
ABC (the debtor) purchased the Webkinz toys on March
6. (minor premise)
ABC has rights in the Webkinz toys. (conclusion)
Goods held for sale or lease by the debtor are inventory.
(major premise)
The Webkinz toys are held for sale or lease by ABC (the
debtor), a toy store. (minor premise)
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The Webkinz toys are part of ABC's inventory.
(conclusion)
The security interest extends to inventory acquired by
the debtor after the security agreement is executed if the
agreement includes an after-acquired property clause. (major
premise)
The collateral description in the security agreement
executed on March 1 refers to "after-acquired" inventory.
(minor premise)
The security interest extends to the inventory (Webkinz
toys) acquired by ABC on March 6. (conclusion)
A security agreement reasonably identifies the collateral
if it describes the collateral by type. (major premise)
"Inventory" is a type of collateral. (minor premise)
The agreement's description-"current and after-
acquired inventory"-reasonably identifies the collateral.
(conclusion)
A security interest attaches, or becomes enforceable,
when the last of the following three conditions is met: (i)
value is given, (ii) the debtor has rights in the collateral, and
(iii) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that
reasonably identifies the collateral. (major premise)
FinCo gave value (as early as March I and no later than
March 6), ABC acquired rights in the Webkinz (March 10),
and ABC authenticated a security agreement that adequately
described the Webkinz toys as collateral (March 1). (minor
premise)
FinCo's security interest attached to the Webkinz toys
on March 10. (conclusion)
2. Hypothetical No. 2
Background: An oral security agreement is effective if the
secured party takes possession of the collateral or appoints a
custodial agent, but the agent cannot be the debtor or a person too
"closely connected to or controlled by the debtor."4 7
47. See id. § 9-313, cmt. 3. See also § 9-203, cmt. 4 (indicating that
"[p]ossession as contemplated by Section 9-313 is possession for purposes of
subsection (b)(3)(B) . . . ").
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Hypothetical: Maris is an avid chess player 48 and collects unique
chess sets. Yesterday, Maris borrowed $4,000 from her father,
Charles. Charles and Maris agreed that one of her chess sets, a 19 th
century Cantonese carved ivory "George III" set,49 Will serve as
collateral. The parties agreed that Maris will retain custody of the set
but will deliver it to Charles at his request if Maris defaults on the
loan. Charles and Maris never memorialize their oral agreement in
writing.
Absent possession, does Charles have an enforceable security
interest in the chess set?
A response, in the form of a single syllogism, could be drafted as
follows:
An oral security agreement is ineffective to create an
enforceable security interest if the debtor (or someone too
closely connected to or controlled by the debtor) possesses
the collateral. (major premise)
Maris, the debtor, possesses the chess set. (minor
premise)
The oral security agreement between Maris and Charles
is ineffective to create an enforceable security interest in the
chess set. (conclusion)
48. So, too, is (or was) composer Ludwig van Beethoven, opera star Enrico
Caruso, actress Marilyn Monroe, actor Paul Newman, film director Alfred
Hitchcock, author John Steinbeck, philosopher Bertrand Russell, basketball legend
Wilt Chamberlain, tennis champion Roger Federer, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, Soviet leader Josef Stalin, gangster Al Capone and supermodel Heidi
Klum. See Celebrities Play Chess, MONROI (Mar. 8, 2008),
http://www.monroi.com/chess-info/44-in/446-celebrities-play-chess.html. Yale law
professor (and bestselling author) Stephen L. Carter also is an avid chess player and
a member of the U.S. Chess Federation. See Meet the Writer: Stephen L. Carter,
BARNES & NOBLE.COM,
http://www.bamesandnoble.com/writers/writerdetails.asp?cid'84255 (last visited
Feb. 5, 2011).
49. An online search reveals that this set has a value of approximately $4,183.
See Chess Sets, ANITQUECHESSSHOP.COM, http://www.antiquechessshop.com/
("chess sets" and "Ref416") (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). Looking for something more
expensive? How about the Jewel Royale Chess Set, commissioned by a British
custom jewelry company. With a value in excess of $9 million, "this single chess set
is the most expensive and exquisite game set of any kind in the world. Constructed
of gold and platinum, it contains diamonds, emeralds, rubies, pearls and sapphires.
The king piece alone weighs 165.2 grams of 18 carat yellow gold and has a spiraling
mid-section graced by 73 rubies and 146 diamonds." Hunter Davis, Most Expensive
Chess Set, THE MOST EXPENSIVE JOURNAL (Mar. 22, 2007), http://most-
expensive.net/chess-set.
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A narrative response, using the premises and conclusion of the
syllogism as a foundation, might be written as follows:
Charles and Maris have agreed that Charles will have a
security interest in a particular chess set to secure repayment
of the $4,000 loan. This security agreement is oral, not
written. An oral security agreement is ineffective to create an
enforceable security interest in collateral that remains in
possession of the debtor, or a party too closely connected to
or controlled by the debtor (sections 9-203(b)(3)(B) and cmt.
4; 9-313 cmt. 3). The parties have agreed that Maris will
possess the chess set until Charles makes a post-default
request for its custody. Because the chess set remains in the
possession of Maris, the debtor, the oral understanding of the
parties fails to create an enforceable security interest in the
chess set.
B. Perfection
After students master the rules for creating an enforceable
security interest, they learn how to perfect the security interest. With
few exceptions, the secured party can perfect its security interest by
filing a financing statement with the appropriate state official.o
The following two hypotheticals address perfection-by-filing
issues (and are prefaced with a discussion of applicable law).
1. Hypothetical No. 3
Background: The two central issues confronted by the filer are:
(1) what information must be provided on the filing, and (2) in which
state must the filing be recorded. Students learn that the filing must
provide the names of both the debtor and the secured party and a
description of the collateral," but, to avoid discretionary rejection by
the clerk, the filing also should provide other information (all
50. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a). Notable exceptions include: deposit accounts and
letter-of-credit rights, which may be perfected only by control (id § 9-312(b)(1),
(2)); money, which may be perfected only by the creditor's possession (id. § 9-
312(b)(3)); motor vehicles and other assets that are subject to certificate-of-title or
other similar state law (id. § 9-311(a)(2)); and assets (e.g., copyrights and airplanes)
that are subject to federal filing laws (§ 9-311(a)(1)).
51. See id. § 9-502(a).
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prompted by the standard filing form),52 such as a mailing address
for both parties and specific information about a debtor that is an
organization (rather than a natural person).53 Students also discover
that, as a general rule, the creditor should file the financing statement
where the debtor is "located," 54 which depends significantly on the
type of debtor (e.g., a natural person, a registered organization,
etc.). 5
Hypothetical (which builds on the previous set offacts involving
ABC Co. and FinCo in Hypothetical No. 1): FinCo files a standard-
form financing statement with the appropriate Colorado official on
March 15, listing the debtor by its legal name ("ABC Company")
and describing the collateral merely as "inventory." FinCo correctly
provides all other information requested by the form.
Does FinCo have a perfected security interest in the Webkinz
toys purchased by ABC on March 10?
A model answer, in narrative form, might read as follows:
A secured party may perfect a security interest in
inventory by filing a financing statement (section 9-310(a)).
As previously discussed, ABC operates three toy stores, so
the Webkinz toys are part of its inventory.
To be effective, a financing statement must provide all
of the information required by Article 9. The facts indicate
that the financing statement correctly provides all required
information. The collateral description omits any reference
to "after-acquired" inventory, but only the security
agreement (and not the financing statement) must reference
the after-acquired property clause (sections 9-204, cmt. 7; 9-
502, cmt. 2).
The financing statement also must be filed in the correct
place. Article 9 dictates that a financing statement must be
filed in the state where the debtor is located (section 9-
301(1)). This debtor, ABC, is a corporation created under
Delaware law, so it is a "registered organization" (section 9-
102(a)(70)). A registered organization is deemed located in
52. The standard financing statement form (also referred to as a UCC- 1) appears
in Section 9-521(a), and the standard amendment form (also known as a UCC-3)
appears in Section 9-521(b).
53. See id. §§ 9-516(b); 9-520(a).
54. See id. § 9-301(1).
55. See, e.g., id. §§ 9-307(b) (stating the location of "an individual," a single-
office "organization" and a multiple-office "organization"); 9-307(e) (indicating the
location of a "registered organization").
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the state of its incorporation (section 9-307(e)). ABC,
therefore, is located in Delaware. FinCo filed its financing
statement in Colorado, however, rather than Delaware.
Because FinCo did not file its financing statement where
ABC is located, its filing is ineffective to perfect its security
interest in the Webkinz toys.56
Using syllogisms, the analysis may be illustrated as follows:
Filing a financing statement may perfect a security
interest in inventory. (major premise)
FinCo filed a financing statement. (minor premise)
FinCo has taken action which may perfect its security
interest in the inventory of ABC Co. (conclusion)
A financing statement is substantively correct if it
provides certain information required by Article 9 (which
does not mandate any reference to the after-acquired
property clause in the collateral description). (major
premise)
According to the facts, FinCo's filing correctly provides
all of the necessary information (although it describes the
collateral as "inventory" rather than "current and after-
acquired inventory"). (minor premise)
FinCo's filing is substantively correct. (conclusion)
A corporation organized under state law is a "registered
organization." (major premise)
ABC Co. is a corporation organized under state law.
(minor premise)
ABC Co. is a registered organization. (conclusion)
A registered organization that is a corporation is deemed
located in the state of its organization. (major premise)
56. What I often read when grading exams is a correct, but conclusory,
statement. For example, instead of the two-paragraph narrative answer, a student
may answer the question with this single-sentence statement: "FinCo filed in the
wrong place so its [sic] security interest is unperfected." Clients may prefer a
bottom-line answer, but law professors favor the analysis necessary to reach the
bottom-line answer.
In addition to the "its" v. "it's" error, my students also often misspell my last
name on the Bluebook covers (e.g., Zimmberger, Zinkletter, Zimmermann, Redford,
Clooney [I assume George, not Rosemary], SexyProf, etc.). Go figure.
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ABC Company, a registered organization, is organized
under Delaware law. (minor premise)
ABC Co. is deemed located in Delaware. (conclusion)
To be effective, a financing statement must be filed
where the debtor is located. (major premise)
FinCo did not file its financing statement in Delaware
(ABC Company's location), but rather in Colorado (store
locations). (minor premise)
FinCo's filing is not effective. (conclusion)
An ineffective filing fails to perfect a security interest.
(major premise)
FinCo's filing is ineffective. (minor premise)
FinCo's filing fails to perfect its security interest.
(conclusion)
2. Hypothetical No. 4
Background: After the student masters the basic filing rules, the
typical Secured Transactions course then focuses attention on events
which may, or may not, affect the continued effectiveness of a
financing statement and the related perfection of the security interest.
One of these events arises when the debtor changes its name in a
manner that frustrates the notice function of the filing. Students learn
that if the name change renders the filing "seriously misleading,"
then the filing (i) continues to perfect a security interest in collateral
acquired by the debtor before the name change and within four
months after the name change,57 but (ii) is ineffective to perfect a
security interest in collateral acquired more than four months after
the name change, absent a timely amendment. 18
Hypothetical (again involving ABC Co. and FinCo): FinCo
perfects its security interest by filing a financing statement with the
appropriate Delaware official on March 15. ABC Co. changes its
legal name to "ToyCo" on June 1 without FinCo's knowledge or
consent.
As of December 1, does FinCo's original filing (which has not
been amended) continue to perfect its security interest in Webkinz
57. See U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(1). See also id. § 9-506(b), (c) (discussing when a
filing becomes "seriously misleading").
58. See id. § 9-507(c)(2).
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toy animals purchased by ABC/ToyCo on September I and LEGO
products 9 purchased by ABC/ToyCo on November 15?
Drafted as syllogisms, the response might look like this:
A name change renders a financing statement seriously
misleading if a search against the new name of the debtor
(using the filing office's standard search logic) fails to reveal
a filing recorded under the debtor's previous name. (major
premise)
A search against the debtor's new name of "ToyCo" is
not likely to reveal a financing statement filed against the
previous name of "ABC Company" (assumed, absent an
actual search report). (minor premise)
The debtor's name change from "ABC Company" to
"ToyCo" has rendered FinCo's filing seriously misleading.
(conclusion)
A financing statement that has become seriously
misleading remains effective to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four
months after, the name change. (major premise)
ToyCo purchased the Webkinz toys on September 1,
within four months after ABC Co. changed its name to
ToyCo on June 1. (minor premise)
FinCo's financing statement, although seriously
misleading, continues to perfect its security interest in the
Webkinz toys. (conclusion)
59. According to the company's web site, the founder (Ole Kirk Christiansen)
created the "LEGO" name by putting together the first two letters of each of the
Danish words, "leg godt" (meaning "play well"), not knowing that "LEGO" in Latin
can mean "I put together." See Company Profile: An Introduction to the Lego
Group, LEGO.COM 3 (2008),
http://cache.lego.com/downloads/aboutus/LEGO-companyprofileUK.pdf.
Interesting facts include: (i) a column of 40 billion LEGO bricks will reach the
moon; (ii) the number of LEGO bricks sold annually will circle the globe more than
five times if laid end to end; (iii) there are approximately sixty-two LEGO bricks for
each human in the world; and (iv) the world's children spend five billion hours each
year playing with LEGO bricks. Id. at 18. The LEGO brick was named "toy of the
century" in 2000 by both Fortune magazine and the British Toy Retailers
Association. See Joseph Pisani, The Making of ... a LEGO, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 29, 2006),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/nov2006/db20061127_1538
26.htm.
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Absent any amendment, a financing statement that has
become seriously misleading is not effective to perfect a
security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more
than four months after the name change. (major premise)
ToyCo purchased the LEGO toys on November 15,
more than four months after ABC Co. changed its name to
ToyCo on June 1. (minor premise)
Absent any amendment, FinCo's financing statement,
which has become seriously misleading, does not perfect its
security interest in the LEGO toys. (conclusion)
A narrative response, borrowing heavily from the syllogisms,
might read as follows:
A name change that renders a financing statement
"seriously misleading" will adversely impact the continued
effectiveness of the filing. A financing statement has become
"seriously misleading" if a search against the debtor's new
name (using the filing office's standard search logic) fails to
disclose the filing against the previous name (section 9-
506(b), (c)). Given the dissimilar nature of the two names
(which do not start with the same letter), a search against
"ToyCo" is not likely to reveal a filing against "ABC
Company," so it will be assumed (absent an actual search)
that the name change has rendered FinCo's filing "seriously
misleading."
A financing statement that is seriously misleading
remains effective to perfect a security interest in collateral
acquired by the debtor before the name change and within
four months after the name change, but the filing (absent an
amendment) is no longer effective to perfect a security
interest in collateral acquired thereafter (section 9-507(c)).
ABC Co. changed its name on June 1, so the four-month
period thereafter expires on or about September 30. ToyCo
purchased the Webkinz toy animals on September 1, a date
before September 30, so the original filing continues to
perfect FinCo's security interest in that inventory. But
ToyCo acquired the LEGO blocks on November 15, a date
after September 30, so the original filing (absent
amendment) is not effective to perfect FinCo's security
interest in that inventory.
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C. Priority
Students probably spend more time in a Secured Transactions
course on the topic of "priority" than any other topic. Priority
disputes arise when at least two parties each claim a superior interest
in the same asset.60 One of the litigants is always the Article 9
secured creditor.6' Other potential litigants include a host of
characters, including a judicial lien creditor, a statutory creditor (e.g.,
the Internal Revenue Service), another Article 9 secured creditor, a
buyer of the collateral, a real estate creditor (arguing over fixtures),
and the bankruptcy trustee.62
Hypotheticals No. 5 and No. 6 address two priority disputes, the
former rather simple, and the latter much more difficult. As before, a
brief discussion of applicable law precedes each problem and its
analysis.
1. Hypothetical No. 5
Background: Students learn that the baseline rule for resolving
priority disputes between two or more perfected Article 9 creditors is
this: The creditor who files or perfects first wins.63
Hypothetical:64 ABC Co. executes a security agreement, on
March 1, which grants a security interest in its current and after-
acquired inventory to FinCo, who makes a $50,000 loan to ABC that
day. FinCo files its financing statement against ABC's inventory
with the appropriate state official on March 15.
At this time, ABC Co. also is negotiating a secured loan with
Lender. With ABC's permission, Lender files a financing statement
against ABC's inventory with the appropriate state official on March
10. On March 18, ABC executes a security agreement which grants a
60. See WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 227-29 (4th ed. 2007).
61. Id.
62. Id. See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-317-9-339 (providing the Article 9 priority
rules).
63. Id. § 9-322(a)(1). The two companion rules are (i) a perfected security
interest trumps an unperfected security interest, and (ii) the first security interest to
attach enjoys priority if both security interests are unperfected. Id. § 9-322(a)(2) and
(3), respectively.
64. This hypothetical is inspired, in part, by a problem in the casebook I
frequently use in my Secured Transactions course. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL.,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING-CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS
210 (3d ed. 2003) (Problem 4.5).
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security interest in its current and after-acquired inventory to Lender,
who makes a $35,000 loan to ABC that same day.
As of July 1, which secured party has priority in inventory
acquired by ABC in February of the same calendar year?
The model answer will include a discussion of attachment and
should reveal that FinCo's security interest attached to the inventory
on March I and Lender's security interest attached to the inventory
on March 18.65 The discussion should then turn to perfection and
priority. The narrative response might read as follows:
A secured party can perfect its security interest in
inventory by filing a financing statement (section 9-310(a)).
If the secured party files its financing statement before its
security interest attaches, then perfection occurs at
attachment (section 9-308(a)).
FinCo filed its financing statement on March 15, so its
security interest (which attached on March 1) became
perfected on the filing date of March 15.
Lender filed its financing statement on March 10, but its
security interest did not become perfected until it attached on
March 18.
Conflicting perfected security interests rank according to
priority in time of filing or perfection, whichever is earlier
(section 9-322(a)(1)). Lender filed first on March 10, before
FinCo filed on March 15; FinCo's perfection date of March
15 is earlier than Lender's perfection date of March 18.
Lender's filing date of March 10 is earlier than any other
filing or perfection date, so Lender's security interest enjoys
priority over FinCo's security interest.66
65. This part of the model answer might take the following form:
A security interest attaches, or becomes enforceable, under § 9-203 when
(i) value has been given, (ii) the debtor acquires rights in the collateral,
and (iii) any written security agreement is authenticated by the debtor and
adequately describes the collateral.
FinCo's security interest attached to the inventory on March 1. On that
date, ABC authenticated a security agreement which described the
collateral and FinCo gave value. ABC previously acquired rights in the
inventory in February.
Lender's security interest attached to the inventory on March 18, when
ABC executed its security agreement and Lender funded the loan. ABC
previously acquired rights in the inventory in February.
66. Notwithstanding numerous in-class examples of similar exhaustive analysis,
and a conspicuous reminder on the exam ("PLEASE REMEMBER TO WEAVE
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The narrative response, rewritten as a series of syllogisms, might
look like this:
A financing statement will perfect a security interest in
inventory on the date of filing, or the date of attachment,
whichever is later. (major premise)
FinCo's filing date is March 15 and its attachment date
is March 1. (minor premise)
FinCo's filing perfected its security interest on March
15. (conclusion)
A financing statement will perfect a security interest in
inventory on the date of filing, or the date of attachment,
whichever is later. (major premise)
Lender's filing date is March 10 and its attachment date
is March 18. (minor premise)
Lender's filing perfected its security interest on March
18. (conclusion)
Conflicting perfected security interests rank according to
priority in time of filing or perfection, whichever is earlier.
(major premise)
Lender's filing and perfection dates are March 10 and
March 18, respectively, and FinCo's filing and perfection
date is March 15. (minor premise)
Lender's security interest enjoys priority because its
filing date of March 10 is earlier than any other filing or
perfection date (March 15 or March 18). (conclusion)
2. Hypothetical No. 6
Background: One of the more challenging priority disputes arises
when X sells assets to Y, both parties have granted security interests
in those assets, and their respective creditors dispute the priority of
those security interests. Article 9 describes this situation as the
"double debtor" problem.6 7 Students are directed to the priority rule
THE RELEVANT FACTS INTO YOUR ANALYSIS FOR FULL CREDIT."),
several students will offer this one-sentence response: "Lender wins because it filed
first." And then my hand takes on a life of its own and writes, in bright red ink,
"Conclusory-EXPLAIN!!"
67. See U.C.C. § 9-325, cmt. 2. I prefer the more catchy alliteration, "dual debtor
dilemma."
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in section 9-325 ("Priority of Security Interests in Transferred
Collateral") and learn that the security interest claimed by the
buyer's creditor is subordinated to the competing claim held by the
seller's creditor if (i) the buyer acquires the assets subject to the
security interest created by the seller; (ii) the security interest created
by the seller is perfected when the buyer acquires the collateral; and
(iii) the security interest created by the seller has remained
perfected.18 Two companion provisions are sections 9-315 and 9-507.
Under the former, the creditor's security interest often survives the
debtor's unauthorized disposition of the collateral. Under the latter,
the creditor's filing (against the seller) remains effective to perfect
the security interest in the transferred assets (now owned by the
buyer).7 0
Hypothetical: Lender has an enforceable security interest in the
current and after-acquired equipment owned by ABC Health Corp., a
Delaware corporation that operates several hospitals. Lender's
security interest is perfected by a financing statement filed in March
2008.
FinCo has an enforceable security interest in the current and
after-acquired equipment owned by XYZ Health Corp., a Delaware
corporation that operates several hospitals. FinCo's security interest
is perfected by a financing statement filed in July 2007.
In November 2008, ABC ceases its kidney dialysis operations7
and sells twenty dialysis machines to XYZ without Lender's
knowledge or consent.
68. See id. § 9-325(a). The statute refers to a "debtor" and "another person" (or
"other person"). One of the difficulties confronted by students in mastering the
statute is application of those terms to specific parties, especially since this specific
priority dispute involves two different debtors, the transferor and the transferee. In
this statute, the "debtor" refers to the transferee. The phrase "another person" (or
"other person") refers to the transferor.
69. See id. § 9-315(a)(1) (indicating that, as a general rule, a security interest
"continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other
disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the
security interest . . .").
70. See id. § 9-507(a) (stating that a financing statement "remains effective with
respect to collateral that is sold, exchanged, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed
of" if the security interest itself survives the disposition under § 9-315(a)(1) or
otherwise, "even if the secured party knows of or consents to the disposition").
71. Dutch-born physician Willem Kolff invented the first kidney dialysis
machine during World War II while working in Nazi-occupied territory. Inventor of
the Week: Willen Kolff LEMELSON MIT PROGRAM (Mar. 2003),
http://web.mit.edulinvent/iow/kolff.html. After the war he emigrated to the United
States and accepted a position at the Cleveland Clinic, where he began working on
an artificial heart. More than two decades later, while at the University of Utah, he
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As of July 2009, determine which creditor's security interest in
the twenty machines has priority.
The model answer will address basic attachment and perfection
issues. The answer also will reflect that FinCo can claim priority
under the baseline "first to file or perfect" rule because its filing date
of July 2007 is earlier than Lender's filing date of March 2008
(which also will be its earliest possible perfection date). But the
model answer should also observe that the basic priority rule of
section 9-322(a) is subject to other priority rules found in Part 3 of
Article 9.72 The priority rule applicable to this dispute is found in
section 9-325.
Presented in the form of syllogisms, the analysis of section 9-325
might look like this:
A buyer acquires collateral subject to the security
interest created by its seller unless the seller's creditor
authorized the sale free and clear of its security interest (or
the buyer is otherwise protected). (major premise)
Lender's lack of consent means that it did not authorize
ABC's sale of the dialysis machines, and XYZ is not
otherwise protected (it cannot invoke the protection afforded
to buyers of collateral because the machines are held by
healthcare providers ABC and XYZ as equipment, not as
inventory or consumer goods). (minor premise)
XYZ acquired the dialysis machines subject to the
security interest created by ABC. (conclusion)
A buyer purchases collateral subject to a perfected
security interest created by its seller if the seller's creditor
perfected that security interest by filing a financing
statement before the sale. (major premise)
Lender perfected its security interest in ABC's kidney
dialysis machines by filing a financing statement in March
2008, before ABC sold the machines to XYZ in November
2008. (minor premise)
supervised the first implant of an artificial heart into a human (Barney Clark) in
1982. See id. For a recent biography, see HERMAN BROERS, INVENTOR FOR LIFE: THE
STORY OF W. J. KOLFF, FATHER OF ARTIFICIAL ORGANS (B&V Media Publishers,
2007).
72. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this section, ... ");
id. § 9-322(f) ("Subsections (a) through (e) are subject to: (1) . . other provisions of
this part; . . ."). The phrase "this part" refers to Part 3 of Article 9 (§§ 9-301 through
9-342).
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XYZ purchased the kidney dialysis machines subject to
Lender's perfected security interest. (conclusion)
A security interest in collateral perfected by filing
remains perfected after its sale unless and until the filing's
five-year period of effectiveness ceases or the seller and the
buyer are located in different jurisdictions and more than one
year has passed from the sale date. (major premise)
Lender's filing in March 2008 remains effective as of
July 2009 because the five-year period of effectiveness will
not expire until March 2013, and ABC and XYZ are located
in the same jurisdiction (Delaware). (minor premise)
FinCo's security interest in the kidney dialysis machines
remains perfected (as of July 2009). (conclusion)
A security interest created by a debtor which otherwise
enjoys priority under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule is
subordinate to a security interest created by the debtor's
seller if the debtor acquired the collateral subject to that
security interest and that security interest was perfected at
the time of sale and has always remained perfected
thereafter. (major premise)
FinCo's security interest enjoys priority under the first-
to-file-or-perfect rule because its filing date of July 2007 is
earlier than Lender's filing or perfection date, XYZ acquired
the dialysis machines subject to the security interest claimed
by Lender, and Lender's filing perfected its security interest
in the machines at the moment of sale and has remained
effective thereafter. (minor premise)
FinCo's security interest is subordinate to Lender's
security interest (or rephrased, Lender's security interest
enjoys priority). (conclusion)
Using the syllogisms as a foundation, the narrative analysis of
section 9-325 might be written as follows:
Section 9-325 states that a security interest created by a
debtor (XYZ) is subordinate, or junior, to a security interest
in the same collateral (the twenty kidney dialysis machines)
created by another person (ABC) if three conditions are met.
First, XYZ must have acquired the dialysis machines
subject to the security interest created by ABC. This
condition is met because: (i) the Lender-ABC security
[Vol. 56: 15811606
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agreement is effective against purchasers of the collateral
(section 9-201(a)); (ii) the security interest survived the sale
because Lender did not consent to the sale (section 9-
315(a)); and (iii) the dialysis machines are equipment for
healthcare providers ABC and XYZ, so XYZ cannot invoke
the protection afforded to buyers of inventory (section 9-
320(a)) or consumer goods (section 9-320(b)). No other
Article 9 provision renders a contrary result, so XYZ
acquired the dialysis machines subject to Lender's security
interest.
Second, the security interest created by ABC must have
been perfected when XYZ acquired the dialysis machines.
This condition is met because: (i) Lender had perfected its
security interest in the machines by filing a financing
statement, and (ii) the filing remains effective after the sale
(section 9-507(a)).
Third, Lender's security interest must never become
unperfected after the sale. That condition is met. The five-
year life of the original filing will not expire until March
2013, and the one-year concern raised by section 9-316(a)(3)
is not relevant because ABC and XYZ are located in the
same jurisdiction (Delaware). Even if the two healthcare
providers were located in different states, the dispute
resolution date of July 2009 is within one year of the sale
date of November 2008.
All three conditions of section 9-325(a) are present.
Therefore, FinCo's security interest-which would normally
enjoy priority under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of section
9-322(a)-is subordinate to Lender's security interest
(section 9-325(b)). Lender's security interest in the kidney
dialysis machines enjoys priority.
D. Default
Part 6 of Article 9 codifies the rights and remedies available to a
secured party following the debtor's "default."73 Article 9 does not
define the term "default," so its intended meaning for any particular
transaction must be addressed by the parties contractually. 7 4 Typical
events of default by the debtor include nonpayment; breach of a
73. See U.C.C. §§ 9-601- 9-628; see also LAWRENCE, supra note 60, at 405.
74. See LAWRENCE, supra note 60, at 406.
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warranty, covenant, or separate contract; lawsuits against the debtor;
and bankruptcy.75
Hypotheticals No. 7 and No. 8 address two common default
issues. Each is prefaced with a brief discussion of applicable law.
1. Hypothetical No. 7
Background: Among its post-default remedies, Article 9 permits
the secured party to dispose of the collateral,76 subject to two
requirements. First, all aspects of the disposition must be
commercially reasonable.77 Second, the secured party may be
required to notify the debtor and other parties of the disposition.
Hypothetical: In 2007, Eirica Macintosh purchased a horse for
personal enjoyment. Lender financed the purchase and obtained an
enforceable security interest in the horse. Eirica named the horse The
Flying Scotsman in honor of one of her homeland's greatest heroes,
Eric Liddell.7 9 Lender never filed a financing statement. Eirica's
sister, Ainsley, guaranteed repayment of the $20,000 debt.
75. Id.
76. See U.C.C. § 9-610(a).
77. See id. § 9-610(b). The parties cannot waive or vary this duty of commercial
reasonableness. Id.§ 9-602(7). The parties can, however "determine by agreement
the standards measuring the fulfillment" of the duty of commercial reasonableness
"if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id. § 9-603(a).
78. See id. § 9-611(b). Notice is excused if the collateral is "perishable" (e.g.,
fruits and vegetables), "threatens to decline speedily in value" (e.g., tickets to an
upcoming event), or "is customarily sold on a recognized market" (e.g., shares of
publicly traded securities). Id. § 9-611(d). The debtor also can waive notice but must
do so by authenticating the waiver after default. Id. § 9-624(a).
Article 9 provides suggested forms of notice. See id §§ 9-613 (not a consumer-
goods transaction); id. 9-614 (consumer-goods transaction). See also id. § 9-
102(a)(24) (defining a "consumer-goods transaction" as a transaction in which
consumer goods secure repayment of "a personal, family, or household" debt).
79. Eric Liddell was the first Scot to earn a gold medal in a track event when he
won the 400-meter race in world-record time at the 1924 Olympics in Paris (a
storyline chronicled in Chariots of Fire, which won the Oscar for Best Picture in
1981). See Awards for Chariots of Fire, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0082158/awards (last visited Feb. 5, 2011). The next
year he returned to China, his birthplace, to serve as a missionary. E. MICHAEL
RUSTEN & SHARON RUSTEN, THE ONE YEAR BOOK OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY 386-87
(2003). In 1943 he was interned at a Japanese prisoner of war camp in Shantung
Province, where he remained until he died two years later, at the age of forty-three,
after slipping into a coma triggered by an inoperable brain tumor. Id. at 104-05, 386-
87.
Liddell's time in China partly overlapped that of medical missionaries Nelson
and Virginia Bell. Their second daughter, Ruth, was born in Qingjiang in 1920.
1608 [Vol. 56: 1581
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wayne L. Rev. 1608 2010
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
In 2008, Eirica obtained a $5,000 loan from FinCo. Eirica
granted to FinCo an enforceable security interest in the horse. Eirica
never disclosed Lender's security interest, and FinCo's search of the
public records revealed no filings against her. Eirica borrowed the
money to pay for some uninsured medical expenses.
In 2009, Eirica defaulted on the $5,000 loan. With her
permission, FinCo took possession of the horse, intending to sell it at
a public auction. Eirica still owes $8,000 to Lender.
To which party (or parties) must FinCo send its disposition
notice?
The model response, in narrative form, might appear as follows:
FinCo must send its disposition notice to the debtor
(section 9-611 (c)(1)). Eirica is the debtor under section 9-
102(a)(28) because she is the party who owns the collateral
(the horse).
FinCo must also send its disposition notice to any
secondary obligor (section 9-611 (c)(2)). Ainsley, as a
guarantor, is a "secondary obligor" (assumed, absent
independent knowledge of the law of suretyship).so
FinCo also must send its disposition notice to other
creditors claiming an interest in the horse, but only if the
collateral is not a consumer good (section 9-611(c)(3)).
Eirica is using the horse for personal enjoyment-a personal,
family, or household purpose-so the horse is a consumer
good (section 9-102(a)(23)). Because the horse is a
While attending college near Chicago, she accepted a social invitation by another
student to attend a performance of Handel's Messiah. This first date led to a
courtship that blossomed into something special, and Ruth Bell became Mrs. Billy
Graham in 1943. See id. at 76-77; see also Kristen Burke, Ruth Bell Graham: A Life
Well Lived, Part 1, BILLY GRAHAM EVANGELISTIC Ass'N (Aug. 1, 2007),
www.billygraham.org/articlepage.asp?articleid=848; Papers of Lemvel Nelson Bell-
Collection 318, BILLY GRAHAM CTR.: ARCHIVES,
http://www.wheaton.edu/bgc/archives/GUIDES/318.htmNo. 3 (last revised Feb. 11,
2002).
80. "One must consult the law of suretyship to determine whether an obligation
is secondary." U.C.C. § 9-102, cmt. 2.a. The general rule is that a guarantor is a
secondary obligor. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 15
(1996). Cf 9A WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
[REv] § 9-102.2, at 9-82 (2000) (noting that a "secondary obligor" is "a surety
(including a guarantor)"); U.C.C. § 9-101, cmt. 4.i. (observing that "secondary
obligor" is defined "to include one who is secondarily obligated on the secured
obligation, e.g., a guarantor").
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consumer good, FinCo is not required to send a disposition
notice to Lender.
The analysis, in syllogistic form, could be drafted as follows:
A person who owns the collateral is the debtor. (major
premise)
Eirica owns the horse (the collateral). (minor premise)
Eirica is the debtor. (conclusion)
A secured party must send a disposition notice to the
debtor. (major premise)
Eirica is the debtor. (minor premise)
FinCo must send a disposition notice to Eirica.
(conclusion)
A guarantor is a secondary obligor. (major premise)
Ainsley is a guarantor. (minor premise)
Ainsley is a secondary obligor. (conclusion)
A secured party must send a disposition notice to a
secondary obligor. (major premise)
Ainsley is a secondary obligor. (minor premise)
FinCo must send a disposition notice to Ainsley.
(conclusion)
A horse used by the debtor primarily for personal
enjoyment is a consumer good. (major premise)
Eirica is using her horse for personal pleasure. (minor
premise)
Eirica's horse is a consumer good. (conclusion)
81. Lender is claiming a purchase-money security interest in a consumer good,
so its security interest is perfected automatically on attachment. See U.C.C. § 9-
309(1). Lender's security interest enjoys priority over FinCo's security interest
because Lender's perfection date (the attachment date) will be earlier than FinCo's
filing or perfection date. See id. § 9-322(a)(1). Therefore, Lender's security interest
will survive FinCo's disposition of the horse. See id. § 9-617(a)(3) (stating that a
post-default disposition "discharges any subordinate security interest") (emphasis
added). Lender also enjoys the right to halt (or, should I say, "rein" in?) disposition
by FinCo, the junior creditor, and demand possession of the horse. FinCo's refusal
to surrender the horse could trigger conversion liability. See id. § 9-609, cmt. 5.
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A secured party need not send a disposition notice to any
other creditor if the collateral is a consumer good. (major
premise)
The horse is a consumer good. (minor premise)
FinCo need not send its disposition notice to any other
creditor (including Lender). (conclusion)
2. Hypothetical No. 8
Background: The secured party who disposes of collateral after
default can purchase the collateral at a public disposition, but it
cannot purchase the collateral at a private disposition unless "the
collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market
or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations."82
Hypothetical: Harringtons buys and sells rare books for itself and
its clients. Last year, Harringtons sold a rare, autographed, first
edition of To Kill a Mockingbird83 to Grace for $1 5,000.84 Grace
82. U.C.C. § 9-610(c). See also id. § 9-610, cmt. 7 (addressing "public" and
"private" dispositions) and cmt. 9 (discussing "recognized market").
83. See HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1960).
The author of the novel, Harper Lee (whose first name is Nelle, her grandmother's
name spelled backward), studied law at the University of Alabama in the late 1940s
and greatly disliked the experience. Rather than pursue a legal career (as had her
sister and father), she moved to New York City to pen the only novel she ever
published. Working titles included "Go Set a Watchman" and "Atticus." She based
the lead character on her father, giving him the first name "Atticus" after Cicero's
friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus, and using her mother's maiden name, "Finch" as
his last. The book was published in 1960 and won the Pulitzer Prize for fiction in
1961. See Harper Lee, NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS,
http://www.neabigread.org/books/mockingbird/mockingbird04.php (last visited Feb.
1, 2011); see also To Kill A Mockingbird, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0056592/trivia (last visited Feb. 2, 2011). Lee was
awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom, our nation's highest civilian honor, in
2007. Kevin Howell, Harper Lee Wins Presidential Medal of Freedom, PUBLISHERS
WEEKLY, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/book-
news/awards-and-prizes/article/14666-harper-lee-wins-presidential-medal-of-
freedom-.html.
Universal Pictures produced the popular film adaptation in 1962. After making
offers to Rock Hudson and Jimmy Stewart, the producers offered the role of Atticus
Finch to Gregory Peck. See NAT'L ENDOWMENT FOR THE ARTS, supra; INTERNET
MOVIE DATABASE, supra. Although the film was not named Best Picture (that honor
went to Lawrence of Arabia), Peck won the Oscar for Best Actor (the only time he
received the award, having been nominated four previous times). Tim Dirks, 1962
Academy Awards Winners and History, FILMSITE, http://www.filmsite.org/aa62.html
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011). In 2003, the American Film Institute named Atticus Finch
to the top spot (ahead of Indiana Jones and James Bond) on its list, "AFI's 100
Years ... 100 Heroes & Villains." In 2007, the AFI ranked the film at No. 25 on its
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paid $3,000 and Harringtons financed the $12,000 balance.
Harringtons retained and perfected a security interest in the book.
A few months later, Grace defaulted on the loan. She returned
the book to Harringtons, who refused to forgive the debt, but agreed
to try to find a buyer.
Two months later, Harringtons sold the book at its monthly
"dealers only" auction. Harringtons participated in the auction and
was the successful bidder for a price that left a $2,500 deficiency.
If Harringtons complied with all notice requirements, and all
aspects of the auction were commercially reasonable, has
Harringtons complied with all of Article 9's foreclosure
requirements?
Drafted as syllogisms, the analysis might look like this:
A public disposition is a disposition at which the price is
determined after the public has had a meaningful opportunity
for competitive bidding. (major premise)
Harringtons sold the book at an auction attended only by
dealers, not by the general public. (minor premise).
Harringtons did not sell the book at a public disposition.
(conclusion)
A collateral disposition that is not a public disposition is
a private disposition. (major premise)
Harringtons did not sell the book at a public disposition.
(minor premise)
Harringtons sold the book at a private disposition.
(conclusion)
A book is sold on a "recognized market" if the book is
fungible and its price is not subject to individual negotiation.
(major premise)
list, "AFI's 100 Years ... 100 Movies (10th Anniversary Edition)." In 2008, the AFI
named the film to the top "Courtroom Drama" spot (ahead of 12 Angry Men) on its
list, "AFI's 10 Top Ten." The Internet Movie Database,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0056592/trivia (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). Also, in
2008, the ABA Journal named the film to its top spot on its list of "The 25 Greatest
Legal Movies." Richard Brust, The 25 Greatest Legal Movies, ABA JOuRNAL, Aug.
1, 2008,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the 25_greatest legal movies/.
84. An online search at http://www.abebooks.com/ on July 10, 2010, disclosed
twenty autographed, first-edition copies of this classic novel available at prices
ranging from just over $700 to $27,500.
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This copy of To Kill a Mockingbird is unique and not
completely identical to any other copy, so the book is not
fungible and its price may be negotiated. (minor premise)
This copy of To Kill a Mockingbird is not sold on a
"recognized market." (conclusion)
Books may be subject to "widely distributed standard
price quotations" (a phrase undefined by Article 9). (major
premise)
This copy of To Kill a Mockingbird is unique and not
completely identical to any other copy and is being sold at a
"dealers only" auction. (minor premise)
This copy of To Kill a Mockingbird is not likely to be
subject to a "widely distributed standard price quotation."
(conclusion)
Article 9 prohibits the secured party from purchasing
collateral at a private disposition unless the collateral is
typically sold on a "recognized market" or is the subject of
"widely distributed standard price quotations." (major
premise)
This copy of To Kill a Mockingbird is not the type of
collateral sold on a "recognized market" and is not likely to
be "subject to widely distributed standard price quotations."
(minor premise)
Article 9 prohibits Harringtons from purchasing this
copy of To Kill a Mockingbird at the "dealers only" private
disposition. (conclusion)
Using the syllogisms as a framework, the model response in
narrative form might read as follows:
Article 9 permits the foreclosing creditor to purchase
collateral at a "public disposition" (section 9-610(c)(1)). A
public disposition is a disposition "at which the price is
determined after the public has had a meaningful opportunity
for competitive bidding" (cmt. 7). Harringtons sold the book
at a "dealers only" auction; the general public was not
invited to attend. Therefore, Harringtons did not sell the
book at a "public disposition."
Instead, the auction was a "private disposition." The
creditor can purchase collateral at a "private disposition"
only if the collateral is customarily sold on a recognized
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market or is the subject of widely distributed standard price
quotations (section 9-610(c)(2)). A "recognized market" is
"one in which the items sold are fungible and prices are not
subject to individual negotiation" (cmt. 9). The book is
neither fungible nor identical to others. And even if this book
or other books are the subject of a widely circulated price
guide, or often disposed of through dealer auctions, the
relevant market is not a "recognized market" (cmt. 9). So the
book does not appear to be the type of collateral typically
sold on a "recognized market." Article 9 does not offer
thoughts on the intended meaning of "widely distributed
standard price quotations," but the lack of an objective,
fixed, non-negotiable price for a unique item suggests that
this rare book does not fall within the exception.
As neither exception applies, Harringtons-by
purchasing this copy of To Kill a Mockingbird at the
"dealers only" auction-has violated the Article 9 rule which
prohibits secured parties from purchasing collateral at a
*85private disposition.
E. Bankruptcy
A debtor that falls on hard times may file a bankruptcy petition,
seeking either to liquidate itself and its assets or to reorganize its
financial affairs.86 Whether the debtor seeks liquidation or
reorganization, the bankruptcy trustee may challenge a creditor's
87security interest under one of its statutory avoidance powers, a
topic often raised in a Secured Transactions course.
Hypotheticals No. 9 and No. 10 raise issues concerning two of
the trustee's avoidance powers. They are prefaced with a brief
discussion of applicable law.
1. Hypothetical No. 9
Background: One of the trustee's avoidance powers is codified
in Bankruptcy Code section 544(a)(1)." This provision, often
85. Some students might extend the model answer to include an analysis of
possible remedies available to Grace. The "call of the question" does not expressly
solicit that information, however, and it is not included here.
86. See LAWRENCE, supra note 60, at 329-30.
87. Id. at 350-52.
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2006).
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referred to as the "strong arm clause," effectively permits the trustee
to avoid any security interest that is unperfected on the petition
date. 9
Hypothetical: Lender has an enforceable security interest in all
current and after-acquired inventory owned by Andersen Electronics
Corp., a Texas corporation. Lender files its financing statement in
Texas, naming the debtor as "Anderson Electronics Corporation."
After the debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the bankruptcy trustee
orders a search report against the debtor's legal name. The search
fails to reveal Lender's filing because of the misspelling
("Anderson" instead of "Andersen"). 90
89. See In re R.F. Cunningham & Co., Inc., 355 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2006) ("Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), a debtor in possession (vested with the powers
of a trustee by 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a)) has the so-called 'strong arm power' to cut off
unperfected security interests such as secret liens."); Margit Livingston, A Rose by
any Other Name Would Smell as Sweet (or Would It?): Filing and Searching in
Article 9's Public Records, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 111, 148 (observing that "the
trustee has the power to avoid unperfected security interests" under Bankruptcy
Code § 544(a), the "strong arm clause"); David Frisch, Chattel Paper, Shakespeare,
and the Insoluble Question of 'Stripping,' 40 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 25 n.27 (2007) ("The
strong arm clause gives the bankruptcy trustee the rights and powers of a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor. Since, under governing state law, an unperfected
security interest would be subordinate to a judicial lien, U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2)(A),
section 544(a)(1) empowers the trustee to avoid that unperfected security interest.");
Charles J. Tabb, The Brave New World of Bankruptcy Preferences, 13 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 425, 445-46 (2005) (noting that "the strong-arm clause, section 544(a),
... avoids liens that are unperfected at the time of the bankruptcy filing").
90. Query how many times former accounting firm Arthur Andersen & Co. had
its name similarly misspelled. The mistake occurs numerous times in judicial
opinions, including many federal decisions just from 2008. See, e.g., New Eng.
Health Care Emp. Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir. 2008);
Cooper Tire and Rubber Co. v. Farese, No. 3:02CV210-SA-JD, 2008 WL 5188235,
at *2 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 9, 2008); Miller v. Dyadic Int'l, Inc., No. 07-80948-CIV,
2008 WL 5070279, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2008); Thomas H. Lee Equity Fund V,
L.P. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 586 F. Supp.2d 119, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United
States v. Lyon, No. CV-F07-491-LJO-GSA, 2008 WL 2626814, at *7 (E.D. Cal.
June 26, 2008); In re Par Pharm. Sec. Lit., No. 06-CV-3226 (PGS), 2008 WL
2559362, at *1 (D.N.J. June 24, 2008); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., Nos. 05-civ-9050 (LMM), 03 MDL 1529, 2008 WL 1959542, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
May 5, 2008); Hicks v. Midwest Transp., Inc., No. 07-cv-854-JPG, 2008 WL
1766523, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2008); Cobalt Multifamily Investors I, L.L.C. v.
Shapiro, No. 06 civ. 6468 (KMW)(MHD), 2008 WL 833237, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2008); Giddy Up, L.L.C. v. Prism Graphics, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-0948-B, 2008 WL
656504, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008); United States v. Jensen, 537 F. Supp.2d
1069, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Regent Ins. Co. v. Storm King Contracting, Inc., No.
06 civ. 2879 (LBS), 2008 WL 563465, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2008); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. N. Picco & Sons Contracting Co., Inc., No. 05 civ. 217 (SCR), 2008 WL
1903 10, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008); Taylor v. Stratton, No. CVF 04-6304 LJO
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Can the bankruptcy trustee successfully avoid Lender's security
interest under the "strong arm clause"?
The model answer, in narrative form, might read as follows
(using "BC" to refer to the Bankruptcy Code):
The "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Code permits
the trustee to avoid any security interest which a hypothetical
lien creditor may avoid as of the petition date (BC section
544(a)(1)). As a general rule, a lien creditor may avoid any
subordinate security interest, i.e., any security interest that is
not perfected as of the dispute resolution date (the petition
date) (section 9-317(a)(2)(A)). The answer to the question,
then, turns on whether Lender's security interest is perfected
on the petition date.
Lender attempted to perfect its security interest by filing
a financing statement. To be sufficient, a financing statement
must provide the name of the debtor (section 9-502(a)(1)). A
SMS HL, 2008 WL 149010, at *12, *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008); Markey v.
Kudelski S.A., No. 06-cv-1300 W (RBB), 2008 WL 65401, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 3,
2008); ASARCO, L.L.C. v. Ams. Mining Corp., 396 BR. 278, 306 (S.D. Tex.
2008). The error also has been known to evade the scrutiny of editors at several of
the best law journals. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot and Jonathan R. Macey,
Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and
Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 356, 371 (2004);
Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1089, 1099 n.14 (2008); James D. Cox et al., There are Plaintiffs and ...
There are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements,
61 VAND. L. REv. 355, 362 (2008); John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis
in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1601 n.83
(1992); Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the Hawks of the Professional World: They
Foul Our Nest and Theirs Too, Plus Other Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84
MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1107 (2000); Daniel L. Goelzer and Susan Ferris Wyderko,
Rule 2(e): Securities and Exchange Commission Discipline of Professionals, 85 Nw.
U. L. REv. 652, 674 n.131 (1991); Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm
Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 277 n.86 (1985); Joseph A. Grundfest,
Why Disimply?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 727, 746 n.96 (1995); Jennifer B. Lawrence &
Jackson W. Prentice, The SEC Form 8-K: Full Disclosure or Fully Diluted? The
Quest for Improved Financial Market Transparency, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 913,
932 n.61 (2006); Richard I. Miller & Michael R. Young, Financial Reporting and
Risk Management in the 21st Century, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1987, 2002 n.57 (1997);
David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 713, 754 n.193 (2002); Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV.
115, 165 (2001); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung
Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 115,
130 (2009); Harris Weinstein, Attorney Liability in the Savings and Loan Crisis,
1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 53, 58 n.19.
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financing statement sufficiently provides the name of a
debtor that is a registered organization (as is Andersen
Electronics Corp.) if the filing reflects the name of the debtor
as indicated in the state's public records (section 9-
503(a)(1)). Therefore, Lender's filing should have listed the
debtor as "Andersen Electronics Corporation," instead of
"Anderson Electronics Corporation."
Whether Lender's spelling error renders the filing
ineffective is dictated by whether the error renders the filing
"seriously misleading" (section 9-506(a)). Normally, a filing
that fails to provide the name of a corporation as reflected on
its charter documents is deemed "seriously misleading"
(section 9-506(b)). The filing will not be seriously
misleading, however, if a search against the debtor's correct
name discloses the original filing (section 9-506(c)).9 1
91. For recent decisions in which a court addressed whether a mistake in the
debtor's name rendered a financing statement seriously misleading, see Peoples
Bank v. Bryan Bros. Cattle Co., 504 F.3d 549, 558-59 (5th Cir. 2007) (filing against
"Louie Dickerson" instead of legal name of "Brooks L. Dickerson" was not
seriously misleading); Genoa National Bank v. Sw. Implement, Inc. (In re Borden),
No. 4:07cv3048, 2007 WL 2407032, at *1-*3 (D. Neb. Aug. 20, 2007) (filing
against "Mike Borden" instead of "Michael Borden" or "Michael R. Borden" was
seriously misleading); Host Am. Corp. v. Coastline Fin., Inc., No. 2:06cv5, 2006
WL 1579614, at *1, *3-*6 (D. Utah May 30, 2006) (filing against "K W M
Electronics Corporation" instead of legal name of "K.W.M. Electronics
Corporation" was seriously misleading); In re Wing Foods, Inc., No. 09-40154-JDP,
2010 WL 148637, at *5 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 14, 2010) (filing against "Wing Fine
Food" rather than legal name of "Wing Foods, Inc." was seriously misleading);
Myers v. Am. Exch. Bank (In re Alvo Grain and Feed, Inc.), No. BKO8-80876-TLS,
2009 WL 5538645, at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Nov. 20, 2009) (filing against "Alvo
Grain & Feed, Inc." rather than "Alvo Grain and Feed, Inc." was seriously
misleading); In re C. W. Mining Co., No. 08-20105, 2009 WL 2601246, at *12
(Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 24, 2009) (filing against "CW Mining Company" instead of
legal name of "C. W. Mining Company" was seriously misleading); Hastings State
Bank v. EDM Corp. (In re EDM Corp.), No. BKO8-40788-TLS, 2009 WL 367773,
at *1 (Bankr. D. Neb. Feb. 10, 2009) (filing against "EDM Corporation d/b/a EDM
Equipment" rather than legal name of "EDM Corporation" was seriously
misleading); First Cmty. Bank ofE. Tennessee v. Jones (In re Silver Dollar, L.L.C.),
No. 06-50568, 2008 WL 3539790, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2008) (filing
against "Silver Dollar Stores, LLC" instead of "Silver Dollar, LLC" was seriously
misleading); In re Jim Ross Tires, Inc., 379 B.R. 670, 674-79 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2007) (filings against "Jim Ross Tire Inc." and "Jim Ross Tires, Inc. dba HTC Tires
& Automotive Centers" instead of correct name of "Jim Ross Tires Inc." were
seriously misleading); In re John's Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc., 378 B.R. 385,
386, 392-96 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (filing against "John Bean Farms, Inc." instead
of legal corporate name of "John's Bean Farm of Homestead, Inc." was seriously
misleading); Hopkins v. NMTC Inc. (In re Fuell), No. 06-40550, 2007 WL 4404643,
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Here, the trustee ordered a search against "Andersen
Electronics Corporation" but that search failed to reveal the
filing against "Anderson Electronics Corporation." Lender's
filing, therefore, is seriously misleading and ineffective.
Absent an effective filing, Lender's security interest is
unperfected. As of the petition date, then, the trustee (as a
hypothetical lien creditor) enjoys priority over Lender's
security interest and therefore can avoid that interest under
the "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Code.
Redrafted as syllogisms, the model answer might look like this:
A secured party's financing statement fails to
sufficiently provide the name of a corporation if the filing
does not utilize the debtor's name as indicated in the state's
public records. (major premise)
Lender's filing names the debtor as "Anderson
Electronics Corporation," whereas the debtor's name as
reflected in the state's public records is "Andersen
Electronics Corporation." (minor premise)
Lender's financing statement does not sufficiently
provide the name of the corporate debtor. (conclusion)
A financing statement that does not sufficiently provide
the name of the debtor is ineffective if the spelling error
renders the filing "seriously misleading." (major premise)
at *1, *3-*4 (Bankr. D. Idaho Dec. 13, 2007) (filing against "Andrew Fuel" instead
of "Andrew Fuell" was seriously misleading); The Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros. Inc. (In re Tyringham
Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 364-68 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (filing against
"Tyringham Holdings" instead of legal name of "Tyringham Holdings, Inc." was
seriously misleading); Morris v. Snap-On Credit, LLC (In re Jones), No. 05-16909,
2006 WL 3590097, at *2-*3 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 7, 2006) (filing against "Chris
Jones" instead of full legal name of "Christopher Gary Jones" was seriously
misleading); Pankratz Implement Co. v. Citizens Nat'1 Bank, 130 P.3d 57, 59, 61-68
(Kan. 2006) (filing against "Roger House" instead of "Rodger House" was seriously
misleading); Corona Fruits & Veggies, Inc. v. Frozsun Foods, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d
868, 869-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (filing against "Armando Munoz" instead of
"Armando Munoz Juarez" was seriously misleading).
For an article that advocates new search logic that utilizes Social Security
numbers of individual debtors, see Kris Fredrickson, Amending UCC Article 9 to Fix
the Name-Error Problem, 40 U.C.C. L. J. 43 (2007).
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Lender's filing does not sufficiently provide the name of
the debtor. (minor premise)
Lender's filing is ineffective if the spelling error renders
the filing "seriously misleading." (conclusion)
An incorrect debtor's name renders a financing
statement "seriously misleading" (and ineffective) if a search
against the correct name fails to reveal the filing against the
incorrect name. (major premise)
A search against the correct name of "Andersen
Electronics Corporation" fails to reveal the filing against the
incorrect name of "Anderson Electronics Corporation."
(minor premise)
The incorrect debtor's name renders Lender's filing
"seriously misleading" (and ineffective). (conclusion)
An ineffective financing statement fails to perfect a
security interest and leaves the security interest otherwise
unperfected. (major premise)
Lender's financing statement is ineffective. (minor
premise)
Lender's financing statement fails to perfect its security
interest and leaves its security interest otherwise
unperfected. (conclusion)
The "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Code permits
the bankruptcy trustee to avoid a security interest that is
unperfected on the petition date. (major premise)
Lender's security interest is unperfected as of the
petition date. (minor premise)
The "strong arm clause" of the Bankruptcy Code permits
the bankruptcy trustee to avoid Lender's security interest.
(conclusion)
2. Hypothetical No. 10
Background: Another of the bankruptcy trustee's avoiding
powers is codified in Bankruptcy Code section 547, the "voidable
preference" statute. 92 The statute permits the trustee to challenge
property transfers made by the debtor to the secured party within the
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 547.
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ninety-day period preceding the petition date if certain conditions are
met 93 and no exceptions apply. 9 4 Analysis of the statute requires
students to determine the date of the transfer.95 If the trustee is
challenging a security interest transfer, possible dates of transfer are
the date of attachment and the date of perfection. The preference
statute assigns the attachment date as the transfer date if the security
interest is perfected at attachment or within the following thirty
days. 9 6 If the security interest is not timely perfected, then the
preference statute assigns the perfection date as the transfer date.97
Hypothetical: Lender made a $75 million loan to the Wyndham
Art Gallery on the morning of June 7, moments after Wyndham
executed a security agreement that granted to Lender a security
interest in all of Wyndham's current and after-acquired inventory of
oil paintings. Lender filed its financing statement on July 20.
Wyndham filed a bankruptcy petition on October 1. The
bankruptcy trustee is challenging Lender's security interest in a
particular oil painting as a voidable preference. Wyndham acquired
93. The statute requires the trustee to prove that the debtor transferred property
to (or for the benefit of) a creditor for a previous debt; the transfer must occur when
the debtor is insolvent and normally within the ninety-day period preceding the
petition date; and, as a result of the transfer, the creditor must receive more on its
debt than it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation if the transfer had not been
made. Id § 547(b). See also id § 547(g) (placing burden of proving avoidability of a
transfer on the trustee). For a "preference primer," see Timothy R. Zinnecker,
Purchase Money Security Interests in the Preference Zone: Questions Answered and
Questions Raised by the 1994 Amendments to Bankruptcy Code § 547, 62 Mo. L.
REv. 47, 48-59 (1997).
In the context of a secured transaction, the typical transfers that are the subject
of a preference attack are the debtor's loan payments and the debtor's security
interests in its property.
94. Nine exceptions are codified in subsection (c). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). The
creditor bears the burden of proving nonavoidability under an exception. See id §
547(g).
95. Determining the transfer date is important because three of the preference
requirements are time-sensitive: the transfer must concern antecedent (previous)
debt; the transfer must be made while the debtor is insolvent; and the transfer must
be made in the so-called preference period (usually 90 days preceding the petition
date). See id. § 547(b)(2)4).
96. See id. § 547(e)(2)(A).
97. See id. § 547(e)(2)(B). By assigning the later perfection date (rather than the
earlier attachment date) as the transfer date, the statute punishes the dilatory creditor
by increasing the likelihood that the time-sensitive elements of a preference action
are met.
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the painting-Breaking Home Ties by Norman Rockwell-for $16
million on June 28.
Can the trustee prove that the challenged transfer occurred
within the preference period?
Written as syllogisms, the analysis might appear as follows:
A security interest attaches on the date on which the last
of three events occur: value is given, the debtor acquires
rights in the collateral, and the debtor authenticates a
security agreement that describes the collateral. (major
premise)
Lender gave value of $75 million on June 7, Wyndham
executed a security agreement on June 7 that described the
98. Lender's purchase price may represent a bargain. Breaking Home Ties sold
for a record $15.4 million at a Sotheby's auction in November 2006 to an
undisclosed bidder. Rockwell had sold the 1954 painting for $900 to a friend in
1960. A few months after the owner's death, his sons discovered the painting behind
a false wall in their father's house. The sons suggested that perhaps their father hid
the painting (a copy of which he had painted and passed off as the original) to
prevent his estranged wife from taking possession. See Carol Vogel, "$15.4 Million
at Sotheby's for a Rockwell Found Hidden Behind a Wall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/30/nyregion/30rockwell.html? r' I &oref'slogin.
For additional (and fascinating) details, see NORMAN ROCKWELL MUSEUM, A
Rockwell Rediscovered: The Tale of Two Paintings (Oct. 5, 2009),
http://www.nrm.org/2009/lOa-rockwell-rediscovered-the-tale-of-two-paintings.
Rockwell's paintings have been at the center of other news stories. In 2007, an
oil-on-canvas painting entitled Russian Schoolroom that had been stolen in the
1970s was discovered in the art collection of film director Steven Spielberg, who
had purchased the painting (without knowledge of its theft) from a legitimate art
dealer in the 1980s. See Stolen Rockwell Painting Found in Spielberg's Collection,
WASH. POST, March 3, 2007, at C4. Also, several Rockwell paintings (including
Saying Grace, perhaps the artist's most beloved work) that were inherited by the
three sons of the longtime art director of The Saturday Evening Post have been at
the center of a sibling feud that has lasted more than a decade, traveled through
several courts, and generated more than 20,000 pages of documentary evidence. See
Alison Leigh Cowan & Matthew J. Malone, A Family Scene Rockwell Wouldn't
Have Painted, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/28/nyregion/28rockwell.htm?-r-2. For additional
stories concerning thefts and forgeries of Rockwell's work, see Mark Durney,
Norman Rockwell Art Thefts, THEFT CENT., Jan. 16, 2009, available at
http://arttheftcentral.blogspot.com/2009/01/norman-rockwell-art-thefts.html.
Beginning in 1916, and continuing for a period of nearly fifty years, Norman
Rockwell illustrated more than 320 covers for The Saturday Evening Post. He
received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977. See About Norman Rockwell,
NORMAN ROCKWELL MUSEUM, http://www.nrm.org/about-2/about-norman-
rockwell/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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collateral as Wyndham's inventory of current and future oil
paintings, and Wyndham acquired rights in the Rockwell
painting on the acquisition date of June 28. (minor premise)
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
attached on June 28. (conclusion)
A security interest becomes perfected on the later of the
attachment date and the filing date. (major premise)
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
attached on June 28, and Lender filed its financing statement
on July 20. (minor premise)
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
became perfected on July 20. (conclusion)
The transfer date of a security interest is the date of
attachment if the security interest is perfected at attachment
or within thirty days thereafter. (major premise)
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
became perfected on July 20, a date within thirty days of the
attachment date of June 28. (minor premise)
The transfer date of Lender's security interest in the
Rockwell painting is June 28. (conclusion)
The preference period is the ninety-day period preceding
the petition date. (major premise)
The petition date is October 1. (minor premise)
The preference period is from July 3 to October 1.
(conclusion)
A security interest cannot be challenged as a voidable
preference if its transfer date is outside the preference period.
(major premise)
The transfer date of Lender's security interest in the
Rockwell painting is June 28, a date outside the preference
period of July 3-October 1. (minor premise)
Lender's security interest cannot be challenged as a
voidable preference. (conclusion)
A narrative response, incorporating the deductive reasoning
expressed in the preceding syllogisms, might be written as follows:
The preference period is the ninety-day period preceding
the petition date (BC section 547(b)(4)). The petition date is
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October 1, so the preference period runs from approximately
July 3 to October 1.
The trustee is challenging Lender's security interest in
the Rockwell painting as a voidable preference. The transfer
date of a security interest is the date of attachment if the
security interest is perfected on attachment or within thirty
days thereafter; the transfer date of a security interest is the
date of perfection if the security interest is perfected later
than thirty days following the attachment date (BC section
547(e)).
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
attached on June 28, when Wyndham purchased the
painting. Lender previously gave value in the form of a $75
million loan on June 7, the same day that Wyndham
executed a security agreement that described the collateral.
So the last of the three conditions specified in the attachment
statute (section 9-203(b)) occurred on June 28, when
Wyndham acquired rights in the painting.
Lender's security interest in the Rockwell painting
became perfected on July 20, when Lender filed its financing
statement.
The perfection date of July 20 is within thirty days of the
attachment date of June 28. Therefore, the preference statute
assigns the attachment date of June 28 as the transfer date.
The transfer date of June 28 is outside the preference period
(which begins on or about July 3). Therefore, the trustee
cannot successfully challenge Lender's security interest in
the Rockwell painting as a voidable preference.
IV. ENTHYMEMES
We have seen that the syllogism consists of three parts: the
major premise ("All men are mortal."); the minor premise ("Socrates
is a man."); and the conclusion ("Therefore, Socrates is mortal.").
Judge Aldisert and his co-authors acknowledge, however, that
"[s]ometimes a legal writer doesn't mention all parts of the
syllogism, leaving you to read between the lines. Logicians are
certainly aware that an argument can be founded on a syllogism
although not all parts of the syllogism are expressed."99 This
argument, often used when one of the premises is obvious, is known
99. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 7-8.
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as an "enthymeme."'ooFor example, if it is generally understood that
" good girls get stars on their foreheads," a teacher may prefer to say
"Lisa gets a star on her forehead because she is a good girl" rather
than "Good girls get stars on their foreheads; Lisa is a good girl; Lisa
gets a star on her forehead."o' The omitted part of the syllogism is
the "enthymeme."l 02
Students often use the enthymeme in responding to an essay
question. They offer a correct conclusion based on two premises, one
express and the other implied. I hate (dare I say "loathe"?) the
enthymeme. As Judge Aldisert has observed, the enthymeme
requires me "to read between the lines." 0 3 Those of us who have
been anointed to teach Secured Transactions have no desire "to read
between the lines" when we grade all of our exams. We expect a
statement of the law (the major premise), a brief discussion of
relevant facts (the minor premise), and a conclusion drawn from both
stated premises. We want a three-legged syllogism, not its two-
legged "cousin."'1 We find that the student who avoids the
enthymeme and expressly (and correctly) states all premises on
which her conclusion rests is a more persuasive writer.
The following are examples of enthymemes that may arise in a
Secured Transactions course, one from each of the ten hypotheticals
in Part Ill.
* From Hypothetical No. 1:
Goods held for sale by a debtor are inventory, so the Webkinz
toys are part of ABC's inventory. (Read between the lines: minor
premise-ABC, a toy store, holds the Webkinz toys for sale.)
100. Id. at 8. See also Andrew Jay McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme
Court: A Critical Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal
Procedure Cases, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 741, 779 (1988) ("An argument that omits
one of the premises necessary to sustain it is known as an enthymeme."); Fred A.
Simpson & Deborah J. Selden, When to Welcome Greeks Bearing Gifis-Aristotle
and the Rules of Evidence, 34 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1009, 1012 (2003) (describing an
"enthymeme" as "a syllogism in which one premise is implicit").
101. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 8.
102. In the example, the teacher has omitted the major premise, known as an
enthymeme of the first order. The omission of the minor premise (e.g., "Good girls
get stars on their foreheads, [so] Lisa gets a star.") is an enthymeme of the second
order. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL
THINNG 54 (1989).
103. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 7.
104. See POSNER, supra note 6, at 831 (referring to "the syllogism, and its cousin
the enthymeme").
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* From Hypothetical No. 2:
The oral security agreement between Maris and Charles is
ineffective to create an enforceable security interest in the chess set
because Maris possesses the chess set. (Read between the lines:
major premise-an oral security agreement is ineffective to create an
enforceable security interest if the debtor possesses the collateral.)
* From Hypothetical No. 3:
FinCo's act of filing a financing statement perfected its security
interest in ABC's inventory. (Read between the lines: major
premise-filing a financing statement will perfect a security interest
in inventory.)
* From Hypothetical No. 4:
FinCo's financing statement, which has become seriously
misleading following the name change from "ABC Company" to
"ToyCo," does not perfect its security interest in the LEGO toys
because a financing statement that has become seriously misleading
is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by
the debtor more than four months after the name change. (Read
between the lines: minor premise-ToyCo purchased the LEGO toys
on a date [November 15] more than four months after ABC Co.
changed its name to ToyCo [June 1].)
* From Hypothetical No. 5:
Conflicting perfected security interests rank according to priority
in time of filing or perfection, whichever is earlier, so Lender's
security interest enjoys priority. (Read between the lines: minor
premise-Lender's filing date [March 10] or perfection date [March
18] is earlier than FinCo's filing date [March 15] or perfection date
[March 15].)
* From Hypothetical No. 6:
XYZ acquired the dialysis machines subject to the security
interest created by ABC because Lender did not consent to ABC's
sale of the dialysis machines, and XYZ cannot invoke the protection
afforded to buyers of collateral because the machines are held by
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healthcare providers ABC and XYZ as equipment, not inventory or
consumer goods. (Read between the lines: major premise-a buyer
acquires collateral subject to the security interest created by its seller
unless the seller's creditor authorized the sale free and clear of its
security interest or the buyer is otherwise protected.)
* From Hypothetical No. 7:
A secured party must send a disposition notice to the debtor, so
FinCo must send its disposition notice to Eirica. (Read between the
lines: minor premise-Eirica is the debtor.)
* From Hypothetical No. 8:
Harringtons sold the book at an auction attended only by dealers,
not the general public, so Harringtons did not sell the book at a
public disposition. (Read between the lines: major premise-a public
disposition is a disposition to which the general public must be
invited.)
* From Hypothetical No. 9:
An incorrect debtor's name renders a financing statement
"seriously misleading" (and ineffective) if a search against the
correct name fails to reveal the filing against the incorrect name, so
Lender's filing is "seriously misleading" (and ineffective). (Read
between the lines: minor premise-a search against the debtor's
correct name ["Andersen Electronics Corporation"] failed to reveal
Lender's filing against an incorrect name ["Anderson Electronics
Corporation"].)
* From Hypothetical No. 10:
The transfer date of Lender's security interest in the Rockwell
painting is June 28 because Lender's security interest became
perfected on July 20, a date within thirty days of the attachment date
of June 28. (Read between the lines: major premise-the transfer
date of a security interest is the date of attachment if the security
interest is perfected at attachment or within thirty days thereafter.)
If a student fails to state the major premise (often the "rule" in a
Secured Transactions course), then the professor may conclude that
the student does not know the law. If a student fails to state the minor
1626 [Vol. 56: 1581
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wayne L. Rev. 1626 2010
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
premise (often a brief statement of relevant facts), then the professor
may conclude that the student fails to appreciate which facts are
important and why they are important. The professor cannot reach
those conclusions if the student accurately states both the major and
the minor premise of her argument. And a student who avoids the
enthymeme and states both premises may be rewarded with a higher
grade. 05
V. FALLACIES
In their essay, Judge Aldisert and his co-authors address "flawed
syllogisms." They offer this introductory example:
Some men are tall. (major premise)
Socrates is a man. (minor premise)
Therefore Socrates is tall. (conclusion) 06
The two premises are true, but the conclusion does not
necessarily follow. "[K]nowing that some men are tall isn't enough
for you to conclude that a particular man is tall."1 07 A discussion of
syllogistic errors, albeit very brief, follows in the essay.
105. One author suggests that the enthymeme has at least one redeeming value: it
may improve the listening skills of an audience. See Ryan Patrick Alford, Appellate
Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of Searching Analysis, 11
MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 348 (2006):
[W]hen all the premises of the syllogism (e.g. Socrates is a man, all men
are mortal) are stated, the audience does not have to engage with the
speaker; when a premise is unstated, (e.g. the truism that men suffer from
mortality) the audience has to become an active listener to participate in
the construction of meaning, to retrace the logic that leads to the
conclusion (that Socrates will die). This technique is an effective means of
encouraging not only active listening, but also of promoting persuasion.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also COPI & COHEN, supra note 21, 231 (suggesting that
"it is not at all unusual for an argument to be rhetorically more powerful and
persuasive when stated enthymematically than when enunciated in complete
detail"); HURLEY, supra note 24, at 297 (suggesting that "[t]he listener or reader's
intelligence is called into play when he or she is required to supply a missing
statement, and his or her interest is thereby sustained").
I am in favor of encouraging "active listening," but I fear that if I emphasize the
enthymeme in the classroom, the students are more likely to respond in kind on the
exam, costing themselves valuable points in the process.
106. Aldisert, supra note 3, at 9.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
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Elsewhere, however, Judge Aldisert offers an extended
discussion of the basic flaw of so many syllogisms: the "fallacy.",o
He explains the term:
As stated before, logicians and members of the legal
profession generally use the term "fallacy" in a narrower
sense, to describe a type of incorrect argument, rather than to
label a statement as false or erroneous. It is used to describe
a flaw in the purported relations between several statements.
There are several types of fallacies. One type of fallacy
occurs when we neglect the rules of logic and fall into
erroneous reasoning, often from true factual premises. Other
fallacies, generally called informal or material fallacies,
meticulously follow logical form but suffer from improper
content or emphasis. A fallacy then is not merely an error,
but a way of falling into an error. The name comes from the
Latin, . . . fallax ... which suggests a deliberate deception.
But most fallacies are not intentional. Fallacies are
dangerous, however, because they are false conclusions or
interpretations resulting from processes of thinking that
claim or appear to be valid, they fail to conform to the
requirements of logic. A fallacy can be defined as . . . any
argument that seems conclusive to the normal mind but that
proves, upon examination, not to establish the alleged
conclusion, or more succinctly, a form of argument that
seems to be correct but which proves upon examination not
to be so. . . .109
For approximately eighty pages, Judge Aldisert then discusses
the various types of "formal" fallacies (errors in the logic of the
argument) and "material" fallacies (problems with the factual content
of the argument). He identifies nine formal fallacies, each of which is
associated with a particular syllogistic form (categorical,
hypothetical, or disjunctive). 1 0
This Part of the article examines the nine formal fallacies that
Judge Aldisert addresses, illustrating how these fallacies may arise in
a Secured Transactions course."
108. See generally LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 137-224.
109. Id. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted).
110. Id. at 141-42.
111. This article does not examine any of the material, or informal, fallacies
identified by Judge Aldisert. He categorizes them as "fallacies of irrelevant
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A. Categorical: Fallacy ofFour Terms
One of the golden rules of deductive reasoning is that a valid
categorical syllogism must have exactly three terms.112 For
example, in the syllogism that addresses the mortality of
Socrates, the three terms are "all men" (or "man"), "Socrates,"
and "mortal." The fallacy of four terms (also known as quaternio
terminorum" ) occurs when one or more additional terms are
introduced into the argument, preventing a logical conclusion to
be drawn from the premises. For example:
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a fan of U.S. Supreme Court trivia. 1 14
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The conclusion does not logically follow from the two
premises because neither premise states that Socrates is a man,
and together the two premises introduce four (rather than three)
terms: all men, mortal, Socrates, and U.S. Supreme Court trivia.
The fallacy of four terms is no stranger to a Secured
Transactions course, as the following two examples (based on
earlier hypotheticals) illustrate.
evidence," "miscellaneous material fallacies," and "linguistic fallacies," devoting
several pages to their discussion. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 142-
43, 169-224. See also HURLEY, supra note 24, at 118-81 (discussing twenty-two
informal fallacies divided into five groups: eight fallacies of relevance, six fallacies
of weak induction, four fallacies of presumption, two fallacies of ambiguity, and two
fallacies of grammatical analogy).
112. LOGic FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 146.
113. See CoPI & COHEN, supra note 21, at 206.
114. Identify the justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from these
three clues. He replaced the justice who hired the first black law clerk. He is one of
five justices to hire a law clerk who later became a member of the Court. After he
resigned from the Court, he presented the oral argument to the Court on behalf of
baseball star Curt Flood, who was challenging baseball's reserve clause as a
violation of antitrust law. (The answer is provided elsewhere in this article.)
For a fascinating account of Curt Flood's personal and professional life, as well
as his legal challenge that took him all the way to the Supreme Court of the United
States, see Brad Snyder, A WELL-PAID SLAVE (2006). Snyder, who began his
academic career as an assistant professor of law at the University of Wisconsin in
August 2008, concludes in his book: "If ever a case had been lost at oral argument,
Flood's was it." Id. at 282. Ouch!
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1. Example No. 1
Hypothetical No. 3 raises perfection issues and requires some
discussion of the proper place to file a financing statement.115 ABC
Company, a Delaware corporation, is the debtor. The two statutes
that govern filing location are U.C.C. sections 9-301 and 9-307. The
former states that the secured party should file the financing
statement in the jurisdiction where the debtor is located.116 The latter
states that a registered organization (defined in U.C.C. section 9-102
in a manner which includes corporations 17) is deemed located in the
state of its creation." Based on these rules, FinCo should file its
financing statement against ABC Co. in Delaware.
The fallacy of four terms, in the context of the previous
discussion, can be illustrated as follows:
All corporations organized under state law are registered
organizations.
A registered organization is deemed located in the state
of its incorporation.
Therefore, ABC Co. is located in the state of its
incorporation (Delaware).
The fourth term is "ABC Company," which appears for the first
time in the conclusion. And the conclusion does not logically follow
from the two premises because neither reveals that ABC Co. is a
corporation or a registered organization.
The problem is easily corrected by drafting the following two
syllogisms:
All corporations organized under state law are registered
organizations.
ABC Co. is a corporation organized under state law.
Therefore, ABC Co. is a registered organization.
115. See supra Part III.B.1.
116. SeeU.C.C. § 9-301(1).
117. See id. § 9-102(a)(70) (defining "registered organization") and cmt. 11
(listing corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships as
examples).
118. See id. § 9-307(e).
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A registered organization that is a corporation organized
under state law is deemed located in the state of its
organization.
ABC Company, a registered organization, is organized
under Delaware law.
Therefore, ABC Company, a registered organization, is
deemed located in Delaware.
2. Example No. 2
Hypothetical No. 7 examines the party (or parties) to whom a
secured party must send its notice of collateral disposition." 9 The
collateral, a horse, is being used by debtor Eirica as a consumer
good. Eirica's sister, Ainsley, is a guarantor. Article 9 requires a
secured party to send its disposition notice to a secondary obligor
(among other parties).120 And the general rule (assumed in this case)
is that a guarantor is a secondary obligor. Therefore, FinCo should
send a copy of its disposition notice to Ainsley.
To illustrate the fallacy of four terms, consider the
following:
FinCo must send a disposition notice to a secondary
obligor.
Ainsley is a guarantor.
Therefore, FinCo must send a disposition notice to
Ainsley.
The fourth term is "guarantor." And the conclusion does not
logically follow from the two premises because neither expresses any
relationship between guarantors and secondary obligors.
As before, however, the problem is easily corrected by drafting
two syllogisms:
A guarantor is a secondary obligor.
Ainsley is a guarantor.
Therefore, Ainsley is a secondary obligor.
A secured party must send a disposition notice to a
secondary obligor.
Ainsley is a secondary obligor.
119. See supra Part III.D.1.
120. See U.C.C. § 9-611(b), (c).
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Therefore, FinCo must send a disposition notice to
Ainsley.
B. Categorical: The Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle
Another universal rule states that a categorical syllogism is valid
only if its middle term is "distributed" in at least one premise.121 In
our paradigm, the major term is "mortal" (which appears in the
major premise and the conclusion), the minor term is "Socrates"
(which appears in the minor premise and the conclusion), and the
middle term is "men/man" (which appears in both premises). 122 But
"appearing" in a premise does not necessarily mean that the term is
"distributed" in a premise. Judge Aldisert explains:
It is critical, therefore, that the middle term encompass a
larger universe than the minor term. Compared then to the
minor term, which reflects only part of the class, the middle
term is considered "distributed." If the middle term does not
represent the larger portion of the class being considered,
and represents or is equivalent to the portion represented by
the minor term, we say that the middle term is
"undistributed." When this occurs the connection to the
conclusion cannot be justified; when this occurs we have the
fallacy of the undistributed middle.123
121. LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 147.
122. Id. at 45.
123. Id. at 148. Professors Copi and Cohen elaborate:
The conclusion of any syllogism asserts a connection between two terms.
The premises justify asserting such a connection only if they assert that
each of the two terms is connected with a third term in such a way that the
first two are appropriately connected with each other through or by means
of the third. For the two terms of the conclusion really to be connected
through the third, at least one of them must be related to the whole of the
class designated by the third or middle term. Otherwise, each may be
connected with a different part of that class, and not necessarily connected
with each other at all. . . . For [the middle term to connect the syllogism's
major and minor terms], all the class designated by it must be referred to
in at least one premise, which is to say that in a valid syllogism the middle
term must be distributed in at least one premise.
COPI & COHEN, supra note 21, at 208 (emphasis omitted). See also HURLEY, supra
note 24, at 282 (using the syllogism--"All sharks are fish. All salmon are fish. All
salmon are sharks."-to illustrate and discuss the fallacy of the undistributed
middle).
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In the classic example, the middle term ("men") represents an
entire class (of which the minor term, "Socrates," is a member) and,
therefore, is "distributed."
But consider this syllogism:
All philosophers can run a four-minute mile.124
Socrates can run a four-minute mile.
Therefore, Socrates is a philosopher.
Here, however, the middle term ("four-minute mile") is
"undistributed" because neither premise tells us the universal class of
124. Roger Bannister was the first person to run a mile in under the magical
barrier of four minutes, when he clocked a time of 3:59:4 on May 6, 1954. He held
the world record for only 46 days, as Australian John Landy lowered the mark to
3:58 on June 21, 1954. The two athletes competed against each other later that year
in Vancouver. Both men ran the mile in under four minutes, with Bannister (3:58:8)
edging Landy (3:59:6). For a page-turning account of their quest (joined by
American Wes Santee) to be the first runner to break the four-minute barrier,
culminating in their head-to-head race, see NEAL BASCOMB, THE PERFECT MILE
(2004).
Hicham El Guerrouj, of Morroco, is the current recordholder, running the mile
in 3:43:13 in July 1999. See Int'l Ass'n ofAthletic Fed'ns, Records by Event, INT'L
Ass'N OF ATHLETIC FED'NS,
http://www.iaaf.org/statistics/records/inout=o/discType=5/disc=MILE/detail.html
last visited Feb. 1, 2011). The best time clocked by a woman is 4:12:56, posted by
Russian Svetlana Masterkova in August 1996. Id
Kansan Jim Ryun was the first high school athlete to run the mile in under four
minutes and is the only American to hold the world record in the event (July 17,
1966-May 17, 1975). See Past AAU Sullivan Award Winners, James Ryun, AAU
SULLIVAN, http://www.aausullivan.org/winners_1966.html (last visited Feb. 1,
2011); Progression of World Record Times for Males, COLO ST. UNIV.,
http://www.stat.colostate.edu/-jah/teach/st540/data/mile.info (last visited Feb. 1,
2011). Sports Illustrated named Ryun its "Sportsman of the Year" for 1966, an
honor the magazine had inaugurally bestowed on Bannister in 1954. See Sports
Illustrated, Sportsman Master List, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/1999/sportsman/master list/ (last visited
Feb. 1, 2011). Between 1995 and 2006, Ryun was a member of Congress from
Kansas. Ryan, Jim (1947-), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=R000566 (last visited June
22, 2011).
In 2005, Forbes.com compiled "a list of the greatest athletic achievements of
the last 150 years," placing Roger Bannister's historic achievement at the top (with
positions No. 2-No. 5 honoring performances by Lance Armstrong, Jesse Owens,
Nadia Comaneci and Joe Dimaggio, respectively). See David M. Ewalt & Lacey
Rose, Bannister's Four-Minute Mile Named Greatest Athletic Achievement, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/18/bannister-four-minute-
mile cx de Ir 1118bannister.html (last visited Feb.1, 2011).
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four-minute milers. 125 The class includes all philosophers. But it also
might include some golfers, ministers, and astronauts. Therefore, to
conclude that Socrates is a philosopher just because he can run a
four-minute mile is not necessarily true. 12 6 This syllogism, then,
suffers from the fallacy of the undistributed middle.
To illustrate how this fallacy might occur in a Secured
Transactions course, consider the following two examples.
1. Example No. I
Rosetta has borrowed money from Lender to remodel her
kitchen. Lender has a perfected security interest in 1,000 shares of
ExxonMobil capital stock owned by Rosetta to secure repayment of
the loan. After Rosetta defaults, Lender elects to sell the capital stock
at a public auction. In drafting its disposition notice, Lender observes
that U.C.C. section 9-613 proposes a model form for all transactions
other than a consumer-goods transaction, and section 9-614 suggests
a model form for all consumer-goods transactions. Lender is also
aware that its transaction with Rosetta is a "consumer transaction" as
defined by section 9-102(a)(26), which expressly includes within the
scope of its meaning all consumer-goods transactions.
In determining which model disposition form Lender should
adopt, a student may offer the following syllogism:
All consumer-goods transactions are consumer
transactions.
Lender and Rosetta have engaged in a consumer
transaction.
Therefore, Lender and Rosetta have engaged in a
consumer-goods transaction.
From this, the student may believe that Lender should use the
model form in section 9-614. That is incorrect because the
conclusion in the syllogism is incorrect. While all consumer-goods
125. See HURLEY, supra note 24, at 204 ("A term is said to be distributed if the
proposition makes an assertion about every member of the class denoted by the
term; otherwise it is undistributed. Stated another way, a term is distributed if and
only if the statement assigns (or distributes) an attribute to every member of the
class denoted by the term.").
126. Note, however, that tweaking the syllogism will correct its fallacy.
All philosophers can run a four-minute mile.
Socrates is a philosopher.
Socrates can run a four-minute mile.
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transactions are consumer transactions, the reverse is not true.127 The
student made the mistake of thinking otherwise, committing the
fallacy of the undistributed middle.
2. Example No. 2
Assume in Hypothetical No. 7 128 that both Eirica and Ainsley
sign FinCo's written security agreement. FinCo will file a financing
statement against the "debtor" to perfect its security interest in the
horse. 129 FinCo knows that a written security agreement must be
authenticated by the debtor. 13 0 Should FinCo, prompted by Ainsley's
execution of the security agreement, file a financing statement
against her?
In responding to the question, a student may offer the following
syllogism:
The debtor must authenticate a written security
agreement.
Ainsley authenticated FinCo's written security
agreement.
Therefore, Ainsley is the debtor.
The student continues her analysis by contending that FinCo
must file a financing statement against Ainsley because she is a
debtor. But that is incorrect. Ainsley is not a debtor because she is
not offering the horse as collateral. Eirica is offering the horse as
collateral; therefore, she (and not Ainsley) is the debtor." 1 While a
security agreement must be signed by all debtors, it does not
necessarily follow that everyone who signs the security agreement is
127. The Lender-Rosetta transaction is an example of a consumer transaction
which is not a consumer-goods transaction because the collateral (the 1,000 shares
of ExxonMobil's capital stock) is investment property, not a consumer good. A
consumer-goods transaction requires the collateral to include a consumer good. See
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(24)(B).
128. See supra Part III.D.1.
129. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (stating that, absent any exception, "a financing
statement must be filed to perfect all security interests"); id. § 9-502(a) (indicating
that a financing statement must provide "the name of the debtor"); id. § 9-519(c)(1)
(obligating the filing officer to index the financing statement "according to the name
of the debtor").
130. See id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A).
131. See id. § 9-102(a)(28)(A) (defining "debtor" to include a "person having an
interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not
the person is an obligor").
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a debtor.13 2 The student erred in thinking otherwise, an error that
illustrates the fallacy of the undistributed middle.
C. Categorical: Fallacy of the Illicit Process of the Major and
Minor Terms
Consider the following two syllogisms.
All Supreme Court justices are brilliant.'
No commercial law professor is a Supreme Court
justice.
Therefore, no commercial law professor is brilliant.
All philosophers are witty.
All philosophers wear togas.
Therefore, all toga-wearers are witty.
In both instances, neither conclusion necessarily follows from its
respective premises.
132. Ainsley may authenticate the security agreement because she is agreeing to
one or more representations, warranties, covenants or duties in the security
agreement. FinCo, the secured party, may authenticate the security agreement for the
same reason.
133. The answer to the question posed in footnote 114, supra, is Arthur Goldberg.
President Kennedy nominated Goldberg to replace Felix Frankfurter. See The
Administration: The Old Order Changeth, TIME, Sept. 7, 1962, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,870085,00.html. Franfurter hired
William T. Coleman as the Court's first black law clerk. See Todd C. Peppers,
William Thaddeus Coleman, Jr.: Breaking the Color Barrier at the U.S. Supreme
Court, 33 J. SUP. CT. 353 (2008). Coleman was the first black to serve on the
management board of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, co-authored the brief the NAACP
filed with the Court in Brown v. Board ofEducation, served as Thurgood Marshall's
personal lawyer, was the second black to hold a cabinet-level position in the federal
government (secretary of transportation under President Gerald R. Ford), and
received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1995. See THE HISTORY MAKERS,
http://www.thehistorymakers.com/biography/biography.asp?bioindex=l 589&catego
ry-CivicMakers&occupation=Corporate%20Lawyer&name=William%20T.%20Col
eman.
One of Goldberg's law clerks was current Associate Justice Stephen Breyer.
See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last
visited Feb. 2, 2011). The other four law clerks who became members of the Court
are John Roberts, who clerked for William Rehnquist, who himself clerked for
Robert Jackson; John Paul Stevens, who clerked for Wiley Rutledge; and Byron
White, who clerked for Fred Vinson. See JEFFREY TooBIN, THE NINE 279 (2007).
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In the first syllogism, the major term is "brilliant." The term is
distributed in the conclusion because of its universal application:
gather all of the brilliant people in the world, and none of them will
be a commercial law professor (how untrue!). As used in the major
premise, however, the term is not distributed because the statement
limits its application to only a segment of the whole: Supreme Court
justices. The mistake is in believing that the terms in the major
premise can be reversed and remain true. But not all brilliant people
are Supreme Court justices (perhaps some are commercial law
professors!). The conclusion extends beyond what can be drawn
from the major premise. This syllogism illustrates the fallacy of the
illicit major.14
In the second syllogism, the minor term is "togas" (or those who
wear togas). The term is distributed in the conclusion, which applies
to all members of its group (all toga-wearers) a characteristic (witty).
As used in the minor premise, however, the term is not distributed
because the statement limits its application solely to philosophers.
The error is that the conclusion states a universal truth about the
minor term (all toga-wearers are witty), whereas the minor premise
uses the minor term to describe only a segment of the whole:
philosophers. The error is in believing that the terms in the minor
premise can be reversed and remain true. But not all toga-wearers are
philosophers (perhaps some are commercial law professors!). The
minor term has limited application in the minor premise and does not
support its universal application in the conclusion. This syllogism
illustrates the fallacy of the illicit minor.13 5
Consider the following two examples, which illustrate how these
fallacies might occur in a Secured Transactions course.
134. See LOGIc FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 154-56. See also COPI &
COHEN, supra note 21, at 208-09; HURLEY, supra note 24, at 282-83 (using the
syllogism-"All horses are animals. Some dogs are not horses. Some dogs are not
animals."-to illustrate and discuss the fallacy of the illicit major).
135. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 156. See also COPI & COHEN,
supra note 21, at 208-09; HURLEY, supra note 24, at 283 (using the syllogism--"All
tigers are mammals. All mammals are animals. All animals are tigers."-to illustrate
and discuss the fallacy of the illicit minor).
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1. Example No. 1
For a security interest to attach, or become enforceable, the
debtor must have rights in the collateral. 136 In Hypothetical No. 1,137
ABC Co. has rights in the Webkinz toys when it acquires them, a
point illustrated by this syllogism:
A debtor has rights in collateral if it acquires the
collateral.
ABC acquired the Webkinz toys (the collateral) on
March 10.
ABC has rights in the Webkinz toys (the collateral).
Assume that in addition to inventory, ABC Co. also offers as
collateral all of its equipment. ABC leases, rather than owns, a
photocopier. Does ABC have rights in leased property? Building on
the previous analysis, a student may offer the following syllogism:
Ownership of equipment gives the debtor rights in the
equipment.
Leased equipment does not give the debtor ownership of
the equipment.
Therefore, leased equipment does not give the debtor
rights in the equipment.
In addition to being wrong as a matter of law, the conclusion
also does not necessarily follow from the premises. It incorrectly
assumes that all rights in collateral stem from ownership of that
collateral. Yes, a debtor has rights in equipment if the debtor owns
the equipment. But ownership is not the necessary predicate to
possessing rights. A leasehold interest in property also gives the
debtor rights in the property sufficient to create a security interest. 38
136. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2). Alternatively, the debtor must have "the power to
transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party," a phrase briefly discussed in id. §
9-203, cmt. 6.
137. See supra Part III.A.1.
138. See WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 84-85 (4th ed. 2007) (observing that a lessee's "right to the exclusive
use and enjoyment of the goods for the duration of the lease term ... may be used as
the basis for the security interest"); Franklin Bank v. Tindall, No. 07-13748, 2008
WL 937488, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2008) (acknowledging that "one who has a
leasehold interest in collateral has sufficient rights in the collateral to transfer
leasehold rights to a secured party" but observing that "the secured interest in such
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The student erred in believing otherwise, a mistake that illustrates the
fallacy of the illicit major.
2. Example No. 2
In Hypothetical No. 6, ABC Health Corp. sold twenty kidney
dialysis machines to XYZ Health Corp.13 9 The analysis revealed that
ABC's creditor, Lender, continued to have a perfected security
interest in the machines after the sale. As a general rule, Lender has
an enforceable security interest in any identifiable proceeds received
by ABC.1 40 Lender's security interest in the identifiable proceeds is
automatically perfected for twenty days.141 If the proceeds are "cash
proceeds" (defined as "money, checks, deposit accounts, or the
like" 42), then perfection continues after the twenty-day period.143 If
the proceeds are not "cash proceeds," then perfection may continue
beyond the twenty-day period, but further analysis is necessary.
Assume that XYZ pays for the machines with a promissory note
which qualifies as a "negotiable instrument" under U.C.C. Article
3 14' and, therefore, is an "instrument" under Article 9.146 Is the
promissory note a "cash proceed"? A student, hoping to conclude
that Lender's perfection in the note continues for more than twenty
days with as little analysis as possible, may genuinely believe that
the note is a "cash proceed." The student may even offer the
following syllogism to support her belief:
circumstances is limited to that which the debtor could convey, a leasehold interest,
and the secured party's interest would be subject to ownership interest of the
lessor"). Cf U.C.C. § 9-203, cmt. 6 ("A debtor's limited rights in collateral, short of
full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to attach"). A secured party who
insists on taking a security interest in leased property should review the lease to
determine whether the debtor can offer the leased property as collateral without
triggering a default under the lease.
139. See supra Part III.C.2.
140. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(f); 9-315(a)(2). See also id. § 9-102(a)(64) (defining
"proceeds").
141. See id. § 9-315(c)-(d).
142. Id § 9-102(a)(9). Any proceeds that are not cash proceeds are "noncash
proceeds." See id § 9-102(a)(58) (defining "noncash proceeds" as "proceeds other
than cash proceeds").
143. See id. § 9-315(d)(2).
144. Id. at (d)(1), (3).
145. See generally id. § 3-104(a) (defining "negotiable instrument").
146. See id. § 9 -102(a)(47) (defining "instrument" to include "a negotiable
instrument"); id. § 9-102(b) (incorporating definitions from elsewhere in the U.C.C.,
including the definition of "negotiable instrument" from § 3-104).
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All checks are cash proceeds.
All checks are instruments.
Therefore, all instruments are cash proceeds.
The two premises are true, 147 so how can you argue with the
logic? The error is in drawing from the minor premise, which applies
the minor term ("instruments") to only a segment of the population
("all checks" but only "all checks"), a conclusion that makes a
universal proposition ("all instruments are"). True, all checks are
instruments. But not all instruments are checks (some instruments
are notes), and therefore not all instruments are cash proceeds. The
student erred in believing that the minor premise would remain true
if its terms were reversed, an error that illustrates the fallacy of the
illicit minor.
D. Categorical: Fallacies ofNegative Premises
A categorical syllogism is invalid if it has two negative premises. 14s
Consider, then, the following syllogism:
U.C.C. courses are not popular.
Popular courses are not boring.
Therefore, U.C.C. courses are not boring.
The conclusion may be false (gasp!) or true (indeed!). But the
conclusion cannot be drawn from the two premises, both of which
are negative. As Judge Aldisert notes, "inference can proceed only
where there is agreement. Two differences or disagreements lead to
no conclusion. . . . If both premises are negative, we cannot
determine anything regarding their relation to one another."l 49 This
syllogism suffers from the fallacy of negative premises.
147. The major premise is true under the definition of "cash proceeds" at section
9-102(a)(9). The minor premise is true (absent the rare case arising from unorthodox
language on the check) under sections 3-104 and 9-102(a)(47).
148. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 146 (Rule No. 4).
149. Id. at 157. Professors Copi and Cohen offer a more technical explanation of
what they term "the Fallacy of Exclusive Premisses":
Where S, P, and M are the minor, major, and middle terms, respectively,
two negative premisses can assert only that S is wholly or partially
excluded from all or part of M, and that P is wholly or partially excluded
from all or part of M. But these conditions may very well obtain no matter
how S and P are related, whether by inclusion or exclusion, partial or
complete. Therefore from two negative premisses no relationship
whatever between S and P can validly be inferred.
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A categorical syllogism also is invalid if the conclusion is
positive and one of the premises is negative. so For example,
All commercial law professors are brilliant.
Richard Posner is not a commercial law professor.
Therefore, Richard Posner is brilliant.
No one doubts the truth of the conclusion.15 1 But the conclusion
does not logically follow from the two premises, one of which is
negative. As explained by one author:
If S [Richard Posner], P [brilliant], and M [commercial
law professor] once again designate the minor, major, and
COPI & COHEN, supra note 21, at 210. See also HURLEY, supra note 24, at 283-84
(using the syllogism-"No fish are mammals. Some dogs are not fish. Some dogs
are not mammals."-to illustrate and discuss the fallacy of exclusive premises).
150. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 146 (Rule No. 5).
151. Nevertheless, the law review editors asked for some support. Would being
deemed a "genius" by a legendary Supreme Court icon (and your former boss)
suffice? See Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court Gets Down to Business: The
Business Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REv. 599, 601 (2007) (footnote omitted) ("Richard
Posner was dubbed by William Brennan as one of two geniuses with whom he had
had the privilege to labor or watch during his many years, indeed decades, on the
Supreme Court. One was William Douglas and the other was his law clerk, Richard
Posner."); David A. Logan, The Man In the Mirror, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1739, 1767
n.148 (1992) ("Justice William Brennan characterized Posner as one of only two
'authentic geniuses' he had met in his lifetime. (The other was William 0.
Douglas.)"). See also M. Todd Henderson, Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1739, 1759 (2007) (citing "Posner's genius"); Lawrence L. Piersol, The
Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society, 52 S.D. L. REv. 444, 445 (2007)
(describing Judge Posner as "a brilliant person with stimulating views"); Robert F.
Blomquist, Judge Posner's Dissenting Judicial Oeuvre and the Aesthetics of
Canonicity, 36 N.M. L. REv. 161, 212 (2006) (mentioning "the mind of a brilliant
appellate judge"); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REv. 753, 800 n.223
(2002) (referring to "Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, the distinguished legal
scholar and conservative icon who was once described as 'the most brilliant judge in
the country"'); Maurice J. Holland, Ill-Assorted Musings About Regulatory Takings
and Constitutional Law, 77 OR. L. REv. 949, 975 (1998) (noting "the work of one
extraordinarily brilliant individual, Richard A. Posner"); Mark M. Hager, The
Emperor's Clothes are not Efficient: Posner's Jurisprudence of Class, 41 AM. U. L.
REv. 7, 61 (1991) ("Posner is widely reported to be brilliant and creative and has
been described by prominent observers, even those who disagree with him, as a
' genius."'); Peter A. Bell, Analyzing Tort Law: The Flawed Promise ofNeocontract,
74 MINN. L. REv. 1177, 1212 n.130 (1990) (describing Posner as "a serious and
often brilliant scholar"); Paul M. Bator, The Judicial Universe of Judge Richard
Posner, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1146, 1161 (1985) (referring to Posner as "one of our
most brilliant and original judges").
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middle terms, an affirmative conclusion always states that
the S class is contained either wholly or partially in the P
class. The only way that such a conclusion can follow is if
the S class is contained either wholly or partially in the M
class, and the M class wholly in the P class. In other words,
it follows only when both premises are affirmative. But if,
for example, the S class is contained either wholly or
partially in the M class, and the M class is separate either
wholly or partially from the P class, such a conclusion will
never follow. Thus an affirmative conclusion cannot be
drawn from negative premises.15 2
This syllogism suffers from the fallacy of drawing an affirmative
conclusion from a negative premise.
Both of these fallacies involving negative premises can appear in
a Secured Transactions course, as illustrated by the following two
examples.
1. Example No. 1
Hypothetical No. 3153 examined where a secured party should
file its financing statement against a debtor that is a registered
organization: the state in which the entity is created.15 4 If the debtor
is an organization that is not a registered organization, then the
secured party should file its financing statement in the state where
the debtor has its sole place of business or, if the debtor has multiple
places of business, its chief executive office. 15s
Where should a secured party file its financing statement against
a debtor that is a limited partnership? As part of her analysis, a
student may offer the following syllogism:
152. HURLEY, supra note 24, at 284. See also COPI & COHEN, supra note 21, at
210 ("[T]o entail an affirmative conclusion, both premisses must assert class
inclusion. But class inclusion can be stated only by affirmative propositions. So an
affirmative conclusion logically follows only from two affirmative premisses.
Hence, if either premiss is negative, the conclusion cannot be affirmative but must
be negative also.").
153. See supra Part III.B.1.
154. See U.C.C. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(e).
155. See id. §§ 9-301(1), 9-307(b)(2), (3). See also id. § 9-307, cmt. 2 (defining
the term "chief executive office" as "the place from which the debtor manages the
main part of its business operations or other affairs. This is the place where persons
dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information, and is the
appropriate place for filing.").
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Limited partnerships are not general partnerships.
General partnerships are not registered organizations.
Therefore, limited partnerships are not registered
organizations.
Both premises are true. The conclusion is false. 1 The
problem with the syllogism, however, is not that the conclusion
drawn from the premises is false. The flaw is that a conclusion-
correct or incorrect-cannot logically be drawn from two negative
premises. This syllogism, then, illustrates the fallacy of negative
premises.
2. Example No. 2
Hypothetical No. 7 examined the party or parties to whom a
foreclosing creditor must send its disposition notice.5'8 Assuming no
exceptions apply, the secured party must send its notice to the
debtor.'" 9 Must FinCo send its notice to Ainsley, a guarantor? A
student may offer the following syllogism in response:
All debtors are entitled to a disposition notice.
Ainsley is not a debtor.
Therefore, Ainsley is entitled to a disposition notice.
The conclusion is true, but not because of the premises.160 The
conclusion cannot follow from the premises because the middle
premise is negative. When one premise is negative, the conclusion
also must be phrased in the negative. The stated conclusion,
however, is stated in the affirmative. 16' The syllogism, then,
156. See id. § 9-102, cmt. 11 (including limited partnerships within, and
excluding general partnerships from, the definition of "registered organization").
157. See id.
158. See supra Part III.D.1.
159. Article 9 excuses notice if the collateral is perishable (e.g., fruits and
vegetables), threatens to decline speedily in value (e.g., Christmas-related items
unsold on December 24), or is customarily sold on a recognized market (e.g., shares
of publicly traded securities). See U.C.C. § 9-611(d). Article 9 also permits the
debtor to waive notice; to be effective, the debtor must authenticate the waiver after
default. Id. § 9-624(a).
160. FinCo must send its disposition notice to Ainsley because, as a guarantor,
she is a secondary obligor. See id. § 9-611 (c)(2) and additional discussion at supra
note 80.
161. A person reading the syllogism may conclude that its author erroneously
omitted the word "not" from the conclusion and intended to state: "Therefore,
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illustrates the fallacy of drawing an affirmative conclusion from a
negative premise.
E. Categorical: Fallacy ofParticular Premises
One of the basic rules of a categorical syllogism is this: "No
valid categorical syllogism with a particular conclusion can have two
universal premises." 6 2 For example, we can conclude that Socrates
is mortal only if one of the premises mentions Socrates (e.g.,
"Socrates is a man."). But assume the major premise-"All men are
mortal."-is accompanied by a minor premise such as "All men are
philosophers." Both premises are universal (applying to "all men"),
from which we are told nothing about Socrates. We cannot conclude
from these premises that Socrates is a man because neither premise
introduces us to Socrates. Such a conclusion assumes that Socrates
does indeed exist, but neither premise proves that point. To draw any
conclusion about Socrates from these premises is erroneous and
illustrates the fallacy of particular premises.16 3
Can a student commit the fallacy of particular premises in
analyzing issues arising under Article 9? Yes. Consider the following
two examples.
1. Example No. 1
Hypothetical No. 1 addresses the conditions necessary for a
security interest to attach, or become enforceable.164 In many, if not
most, secured transactions, a written security agreement will
evidence the debtor's intent to grant a security interest in one or
more of its assets. Article 9 mandates than any written security
agreement must be authenticated by the debtor and include a
description that reasonably identifies the collateral.16 5 A student may
Ainsley is not entitled to a disposition notice." That conclusion appears to better
follow from the premises, but it would be incorrect as a matter of law. See id. It also
would create a syllogism that suffers from the fallacy of the illicit major.
162. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 146.
163. Professors Copi and Cohen refer to this as "the Existential Fallacy,"
observing that "[a] particular proposition asserts the existence of objects of a
specified kind, so to infer it from two universal premisses that do not assert the
existence of anything at all is clearly to go beyond what is warranted by the
premisses." COPI & COHEN, supra note 21, at 210-11.
164. See supra Part III.A. 1.
165. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203(b)(3)(A), 9-108.
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address whether the FinCo-ABC agreement meets these two
requirements by offering the following syllogism:
All written security agreements must be authenticated by
the debtor.
All written security agreements must provide an
adequate description of collateral.
Therefore, the FinCo-ABC security agreement satisfies
both conditions.
The conclusion may be (and actually is) correct, based on the
facts provided. But the conclusion does not necessarily follow from
the two premises, neither of which tells us anything about the FinCo-
ABC security agreement (or if such an agreement exists). The two
premises are universal, but the conclusion is particular, and the
syllogism reveals the fallacy of particular premises.
2. Example No. 2
Hypothetical No. 4 addressed the continued effectiveness of a
financing statement after a debtor changes its name.166
If a search against the new name fails to reveal the filing under
the original name, the financing statement has become seriously
misleading.167 A filing that has become seriously misleading will
continue to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the
debtor before, or within four months after, the name change.168 But,
absent a timely amendment, the filing will not perfect a security
interest in collateral acquired more than four months after the name
change.169
In Hypothetical No. 4, ABC Co. changes its legal name to
"ToyCo" on June I and purchases the LEGO blocks on November
15. In addressing whether FinCo's filing remains effective after the
name change to perfect a security interest in the LEGO blocks, a
student may offer the following syllogism:
A financing statement rendered seriously misleading by
the debtor's name change continues to perfect a security
166. See supra Part III.B.2.
167. See U.C.C. § 9-506(b)-(c).
168. See id. § 9-507(c)(1).
169. See id. § 9-507(c)(2).
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interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within
four months after, the name change.
A financing statement rendered seriously misleading by
the debtor's name change does not (absent a timely
amendment) continue to perfect a security interest in
collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after
the name change.
Therefore, FinCo's financing statement 70 no longer
perfects a security interest in the LEGO blocks.
The conclusion, although factually and legally correct, does not
necessarily follow from the two premises. Each premise states a
universal truth gleaned from one of the two parts of U.C.C. section
9-507(c). But neither premise tells us anything about when (or if)
ToyCo purchased the LEGO blocks, and this means that the
syllogism cannot offer a particular conclusion. However, this
syllogism erroneously does so, illustrating the fallacy of particular
premises.
F. Conditional: Denying the Antecedent and Affirming the
Consequent
Many conditional syllogisms take the following form:
If A, then B.
A.
Therefore, B.
The major premise contains two conditional propositions. The
"if' condition is the "antecedent," and the "then" condition is the
"consequent."' 7'
For example, (i) if Socrates is a man, then he is mortal; (ii)
Socrates is a man; (iii) therefore, Socrates is mortal. The minor
premise affirms the antecedent, allowing the conclusion to affirm the
consequent. This argument form is known as "affirming the
antecedent."172
170. Hopefully, previous analysis reveals that FinCo's filing has been rendered
seriously misleading by the debtor's change of name from "ABC Company" to
"ToyCo."
171. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 160; COPI & COHEN, supra note
21, at 240.
172. See CoPi & COHEN, supra note 21, at 240. This form also is known as modus
ponens, from the Latin ponere, meaning "to affirm." Id.
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Conditional syllogisms also can take the following form:
If A, then B.
Not B.
Therefore, not A.
For example, (i) if Socrates is a philosopher, then he wears a
toga; (ii) Socrates does not wear a toga; (iii) therefore, Socrates is not
a philosopher. The minor premise denies the consequent and allows
the conclusion to deny the antecedent. This argument form is known
as "denying the consequent."l 7 3
These two syllogisms may be written in flawed form, however.
For example, (i) if Socrates is a man, then he is mortal; (ii) Socrates
is mortal; (iii) therefore, Socrates is a man. Or consider this example:
(i) if Socrates is a philosopher, then he wears a toga; (ii) Socrates is
not a philosopher; (iii) therefore, Socrates does not wear a toga. In
neither syllogism does the conclusion necessarily follow from the
two premises. In the first, Socrates may-or may not-be a man. We
do not know, because the minor premise does not affirm the
antecedent. Instead, this syllogism suffers from the fallacy known as
"affirming the consequent."1 74 In the second, Socrates may-or may
not-wear a toga. We do not know, because the minor premise fails
to deny the consequent. Instead, this syllogism suffers from the
fallacy known as "denying the antecedent."175 Both fallacies can
occur in a Secured Transactions course, as suggested by the
following two examples.
1. Example No. 1 (affirming the consequent)
In a previous example, 17 6 Lender has a perfected security interest
in 1,000 shares of ExxonMobil capital stock owned by Rosetta to
173. Id. at 241. This form also is known as modus tollens, from the Latin tollere,
meaning "to deny." Id.
174. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 161; COPI & COHEN, supra note
21, at 240-41; PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 335 (7th ed.
2007) (using the syllogism-"If Napoleon was killed in a plane crash, then
Napoleon is dead. Napoleon is dead. Therefore, Napoleon was killed in a plane
crash."-to illustrate and discuss an argument which affirms the consequent).
175. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 160-61; CoPI & COHEN, supra
note 21, at 241; HURLEY, supra note 24, at 282 (using the syllogism--"If Napoleon
was killed in a plane crash, then Napoleon is dead. Napoleon was not killed in a
plane crash. Therefore, Napoleon is not dead."-to illustrate and discuss an
argument which denies the consequent).
176. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
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secure repayment of a loan that permits her to remodel her kitchen.
How did Lender perfect its security interest? The facts are silent. A
student might use the following syllogism to respond to the question:
If Lender filed a financing statement, then its security
interest in the 1,000 shares of ExxonMobil capital stock is
perfected.
Lender's security interest in the 1,000 shares of
ExxonMobil capital stock is perfected.
Therefore, Lender filed a financing statement.
The conclusion may or may not be true. A security interest in the
ExxonMobil shares ("investment property" under Article 9177) may
be perfected by filing a financing statement.178 But Lender can also
perfect its security interest by achieving control of the shares 79 or
taking delivery of the shares.180 The syllogism does not state which
option Lender exercised, and the minor premise fails to address the
antecedent condition of the major premise. Instead, the syllogism
suffers from the fallacy of "affirming the consequent."
2. Example No. 2 (denying the antecedent)
Hypothetical No. 7 addresses whether Article 9 requires FinCo
to send its disposition notice to Eirica, Ainsley, or Lender."s' The
facts indicate that Eirica owns the horse and Ainsley is a guarantor.
In analyzing whether Ainsley is entitled to notice, a student may
propose the following syllogism:
177. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(49) (defining "investment property"). If Rosetta
purchased the shares directly from ExxonMobil, then the shares are "certificated
securities" if evidenced by a certificate or "uncertificated securities" if not
evidenced by a certificate. If Rosetta purchased the shares through a "securities
intermediary," her property interest is a "securities entitlement" and Rosetta is an
"entitlement holder." All five terms are defined in section 8-102(a).
178. See U.C.C. § 9-312(a).
179. See id § 9-314(a).
180. See id. § 9-313(a). This option applies only if the shares are certificated
securities. If the shares are in certificated form and bearer form and delivered to
Lender, then delivery of the shares to Lender also gives Lender control of the shares.
See id. § 8-106(a). But if the certificate is in registered form, delivery alone will not
give Lender control. Additionally, the certificate must be either indorsed (in blank,
or to the Lender) or registered in Lender's name. See id. § 8-106(b).
181. See supra Part III.D.L.
[Vol. 56: 15811648
HeinOnline  -- 56 Wayne L. Rev. 1648 2010
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
If Ainsley is a debtor, then she is entitled to a disposition
notice.
Ainsley is not a debtor.
Therefore, she is not entitled to a disposition notice.
Both premises are true, but the conclusion does not necessarily
follow. In fact, Ainsley is entitled to a disposition notice because she
is a secondary obligor.18 2 The defect in the syllogism is that the
minor premise fails to deny the consequent condition (the "then"
clause in the major premise). Instead, the syllogism illustrates the
fallacy of "denying the antecedent" (the "if' clause in the major
premise).
G. Disjunctive: Fallacy of the Improper Disjuncts
A disjunctive syllogism consists of (i) a major premise which
offers a disjunctive proposition ("Socrates is alive or dead."), (ii) a
minor premise which affirms or denies one of the options from the
major premise ("Socrates is dead."), and (iii) a conclusion which
takes the opposite action with respect to the other option ("Socrates
is not alive."). 183
A disjunctive syllogism is valid only if the options are
exhaustive and mutually exclusive.184 Consider these two examples:
The film for which Meryl Streep won her only Oscar for
Best Actress is The Deer Hunter, Kramer vs. Kramer, The
French Lieutenant's Woman or Out ofAfrica.
Meryl Streep did not win an Oscar for Best Actress for
her work in The Deer Hunter, Kramer vs. Kramer or The
French Lieutenant's Woman.
Therefore, the film for which Meryl Streep won her only
Oscar for Best Actress is Out ofAfrica.
Law professors are either outstanding teachers or
productive scholars.
Law professor Smith is a productive scholar.
182. See id. § 9-611(c)(2).
183. See LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, supra note 102, at 163.
184. Id. (observing that the major premise of a disjunctive syllogism must
"express a complete disjunction in the sense that its alternative terms be mutually
exclusive and collectively exhaustive").
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Therefore, law professor Smith is not an outstanding
teacher.
Neither syllogism is valid. The first offers a major premise
which fails to provide an exhaustive list of all possibilities (including
the correct response: Sophie's Choice), leading to an erroneous
conclusion.s18  The second offers options which are not necessarily
mutually exclusive (some law professors are both outstanding
teachers and productive scholars), leading to a conclusion which may
be invalid.
The following two examples illustrate that disjunctive syllogisms
used to address Article 9 issues may fail to offer alternatives that are
exhaustive or exclusive:
1. Example No. 1
Last week, Lisa purchased two award-winning books from a
children's bookstore: The Tale ofDespereaux, autographed by author
Kate DiCamillo; and The Polar Express, autographed by author and
illustrator Chris Van Allsburg.18 6 The purchase was made on credit
185. An exhaustive list would not necessarily include all of the films in which
Meryl Streep has appeared. A complete list would, however, include all thirteen of
the films for which the screen icon has received an Oscar nomination for Best
Actress: The French Lieutenant's Woman, Sophie's Choice (won), Silkwood, Out of
Africa, Ironweed, Evil Angels, Postcards from the Edge, The Bridges of Madison
County, One True Thing, Music of the Heart, The Devil Wears Prada, Doubt, and
Julie & Julia. See Awards for Meryl Streep, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000658/awards (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). Streep
has also received an Oscar nomination for Best Supporting Actress for her work in
The Deer Hunter, Kramer vs. Kramer (won), and Adaptation. Id. Her sixteen
nominations are more than any other actor or actress has received (Jack Nicholson
and Katharine Hepburn tie for second place with twelve nominations). See All About
Oscar: Academy Trivia and Statistics, REEL CLASSICS,
http://www.reelclassics.com/Articles/General/oscar-trivia-article.htm (last visited
Feb. 4, 2010). And to think that one of our greatest film stars might have opted for
law school if she had not slept through the LSAT! See Meryl Streep Wanted to be a
Lawyer, A WORLD NEWS (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.aworldnews.com/meryl-streep-
wanted-to-be-a-lawyer-25050.
186. The Tale ofDespereaux received the Newbery Medal in 2004, and The Polar
Express won the Caldecott Medal in 1986. See Newbery Medal Winners, 1922-
Present, ALA.ORG,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/alsc/awardsgrants/bookmedia/newberymedal/new
berywinners/medalwinners.cfn (last visited Feb. 4, 2011); Caldecott Medal
Winners, 1938-Present, ALA.ORG,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/alsc/awardsgrants/bookmedia/caldecottmedal/cal
decottwinners/caldecottmedal.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). Both medals are
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(but Lisa did not offer her credit card as a payment device). The
bookstore intends to offer all of its payment receivables, including
the amount payable by Lisa, as collateral for a loan. What term does
Article 9 give to the bookstore's payment receivable owed by Lisa?
A student may respond by offering the following disjunctive
syllogism:
A right to receive payment for goods sold is either an
account or an instrument.
The right to receive payment from Lisa is not an
account.
Therefore, the right to receive payment from Lisa is an
instrument.
The minor premise may be correct, although the definition of
"account" includes more than credit card receivables.187  The
conclusion may also be correct if Lisa's payment obligation is
evidenced by a writing that falls within the definition of
"instrument."'8 But the syllogism is flawed because its major
premise fails to provide an exhaustive list of alternatives. Lisa's
payment obligation may be an account. It also may be an instrument.
But a third possibility exists: chattel paper. Perhaps Lisa signed a
non-negotiable writing which evidenced both her monetary
obligation and a security interest (in favor of the bookstore) in the
awarded annually by the Association for Library Service to Children, a division of
the American Library Association. Id. The Newbery Medal (named for John
Newbery, an 18th-century bookseller) honors "the author of the most distinguished
contribution to American literature for children." See Welcome to the Newbery
Medal Home Page!, ALA.ORG,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/alsc/awardsgrants/bookmedia/newberymedal/new
berymedal.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). The Caldecott Medal (named for Randolf
Caldecott, a 19th-century English illustrator), is presented to "the artist of the most
distinguished American picture book for children." See Welcome to the Caldecott
Medal Home Page!, ALA.ORG,
http://www.ala.org/ala/mgrps/divs/alsc/awardsgrants/bookmedia/caldecottmedia/cal
decottmedal.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
187. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (including eight specific payment rights within the
definition of "account").
188. The definition of "instrument" includes a "negotiable instrument" as defined
in section 3-104, as well as "any other writing that evidences a right to the payment
of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type
that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary
indorsement or assignment." Id. § 9-102(a)(47). See also id. § 9-102(b)
(incorporating the definition of "negotiable instrument" from § 3-104).
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two books. If so, the payment obligation is chattel paper,'89 rather
than an account or an instrument.190 The syllogism is invalid, then,
because the major premise fails to offer an exhaustive list of
alternatives.
2. Example No. 2
Hypothetical No. 4 addressed the continued effectiveness of a
financing statement after the debtor, ABC Company, changed its
legal name to "ToyCo."' 9 ' In analyzing whether this name change
adversely affects FinCo's perfection, a student may offer this
syllogism:
A financing statement rendered seriously misleading by
the debtor's name change either continues to perfect, or
ceases to perfect, a security interest in the collateral.
FinCo's financing statement, rendered seriously
misleading by the debtor's name change from "ABC
Company" to "ToyCo," no longer perfects a security interest
in the collateral.
Therefore, FinCo's security interest in the collateral is
unperfected.
The minor premise may be true, as may be the conclusion. Either
or both may instead be false. The uncertainty arises because the
major premise fails to accurately state the applicable law. The
alternatives presented are "continues to perfect" or "ceases to
perfect." Under the relevant law, however, the financing statement
may continue to perfect (collateral acquired before or within four
months after the name change) and fail to perfect (collateral acquired
more than four months after the name change).19 2 The fallacy in the
syllogism is that the options are not mutually exclusive (at least in
the manner phrased in the major premise).
189. See id. § 9-102(a)( 11) (defining "chattel paper").
190. The definition of "account" expressly excludes any payment rights
"evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument." See id. § 9-102(a)(2). The
"nonnegotiable" and secured nature of the hypothetical writing likely prevents the
writing from falling within the definition of "instrument."
191. See supra Part III.B.2.
192. See U.C.C. § 9-507(c).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Judge Aldisert and his co-authors call for law professors to apply
core principles of logic in the classroom. A core principle of logic is
deductive reasoning. Therefore, Judge Aldisert and his co-authors
call for law professors to apply deductive reasoning in the classroom.
A syllogism draws a conclusion from two premises. Drawing a
conclusion from two premises is the classic tool of deductive
reasoning. Therefore, the syllogism is the classic tool of deductive
reasoning.
The syllogism is very effective in mastering the law in a rules-
based course. Secured Transactions is a rules-based course.
Therefore, the syllogism is very effective in mastering the law in
Secured Transactions.
Consummate deductive reasoning avoids the form of argument
that omits one of the premises necessary to sustain its conclusion.
The form of argument which omits one of the premises necessary to
sustain its conclusion is an enthymeme. Therefore, consummate
deductive reasoning avoids the enthymeme.
Syllogisms must avoid logical errors in the apparent relationship
among its premises and conclusion. Logical errors in the apparent
relationship among the premises and conclusion are known as formal
fallacies. Therefore, syllogisms must avoid formal fallacies.
Proper syllogistic reasoning greatly improves the content of a
narrative analysis. Improving the content of a narrative analysis
leads to a better exam performance. Therefore, proper syllogistic
reasoning leads to a better exam performance.
Law professors who teach Secured Transactions should seriously
consider using learning tools that foster enhanced understanding of
the subject matter and lead to better exam performance. A learning
tool that fosters enhanced understanding of the subject matter and
leads to better exam performance is the syllogism. Law professors
who teach Secured Transactions should seriously consider using the
syllogism as a learning tool.
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